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Judicial Enforcement of Fair Housing
Laws: An Analysis of Some
Unexamined Problems that the
Fair Housing Amendments
Act of 1983 Would Eliminate
WILLY E.

RICE*

INTRODUCTION

Although the National Committee Against Discrimination in
Housing's 1979 study' could not determine the "true" incidence of
racial discrimination, it did produce some startling results. For example, if a black person were to visit three private apartment complexes, the probability of his encountering racial discrimination
would be sixty-one percent.2 Moreover, an increase in the number
of visits dramatically increased the probability of discrimination.
The probability of discrimination would be ninety percent if the
black prospective renter were to visit seven complexes? The likelihood of discrimination in the sale of housing was also found to be
high. For example, if a prospective black buyer were to visit three or
five brokers, the probability of discrimination would be forty percent
and fifty-six percent, respectively. 4
Many factors contribute to the persistently high incidence of
B.A. 1970, University of Alabama; M.A. 1972, Ph. D. 1974, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Post Doctoral Fellow 1977, The Johns Hopkins University; J.D. 1982,
University of Texas at Austin Visiting Assistant Professor of Public Law, Department of
Government, University of Texas at Austin.
I. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, MEASURING RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING MARKETS:
THE HOUSING MARKET PRACTICES
SURVEY. Washington, D.C. (1979) [hereinafter cited as HOUSING MARKET SURVEY].

2. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT. GUIDE TO FAIR HousING LAW ENFORCEMENT. Washington, D.C. (1979) [hereinafter cited as GUIDE TO FAIR
HOUSING].

3. Id at 55.
4. Id
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private housing discrimination; however, the behavior of real estate
brokers5 and the poor enforcement of both federal 6 and state 7 fair
housing laws have been cited as very important contributing factors.
This article reviews federal, state, and local laws and the history
of judicial enforcement of these laws. In addition, the article compares and contrasts two competing Senate bills that would amend
the enforcement provisions of the 1968 Civil Rights Act. Reference
is made to the proposed Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1983 and
the Equal Access to Housing Act of 1983. The primary purpose of
the article, however, is to show that judicial enforcement of fair
housing laws is only minimally effective.8 There are both obvious
and unexamined problems associated with private litigation which
undermine the effectiveness of judicial enforcement. After considering the relevant data in two hundred and one private discrimination
in housing suits,' this article calls for the enactment of the Fair
Housing Amendment Act rather than the Equal Access to Housing
Act. The latter act would increase the likelilhood of private litigation and would, thus, make only a minor contribution to the reduc5. For a thorough discussion of the role real estate brokers play in housing discrimination, see Note, Racial Steering- The Real Estate Broker and Title V1II, 85 YALE L.J. 808 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Racial Steering]: S. Palmer, The Role of the Real Estate Agent in
the Structuring of Residential Areas: A Study in Social Control 56-57 (1955) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, available in Yale University).
6. See D. Falk & H.M. Franklin, EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY: THE UNFINISHED
FEDERAL AGENDA 60-61 (1976) [hereinafter cited as EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY]. These
authors argue that "the continuation of racially-discriminatory practices in the private housing
market is explainable in part by the ineffective implementation of the existing civil fights acts."
The problem is not the acts per se; instead, the problem can be attributed "to an understaffed
agency (HUD) that cannot process complaints with sufficient speed and, more importantly, to
a cumbersome conciliation process that lacks enforcement teeth, [s]ince HUD cannot issue
cease and desist orders."
7. It has been observed that the majority of state agencies are underfunded, understaffed
and incompetent. Vigorous enforcement action by state agencies tends to be the exception
rather than the rule. See supra note 2, at 6.
8. This conclusion parallels that proffered by HUD which investigated the overall enforcement record of suits initiated under Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3631 (1976)). (The terms "Title VIII" and "Fair Housing Act of 1968" will be used
interchangeably throughout this article). See GUIDE TO FAIR HOUSING at 7. For a discussion
of federal enforcement efforts, see 2 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 52-70 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCE-

MENT]. The Commission found that out of a sample of 1,601 complaints handled by HUD
during a nine-month period, approximately four-fifths (1,339) were dropped without giving
plaintiffs any relief.
9. See infra notes 157-59.
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tion of the persistently high incidence of discrimination in private
housing.
I.

OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING LAWS

An individual who believes that he is a victim of housing discrimination may initiate civil action under the Civil Rights Act of
1866, " the Civil Rights Act of 1968, " or the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Moreover, the alleged victim may initiate his action simultaneously under all three, for federal courts
have ruled that civil action under any one of the above is independent of and not limited by another.12 For example, a proper section
1982 suit can proceed even if the facts would not support a Title VIII
claim.' 3
Among many factors, the following six are most likely to determine the probability of complainants' success when suits are initiated under one or more federal laws: (1) the types of discrimination
prohibited by each statute; (2) the proof needed to establish a prima
facie case of housing discrimination; (3) the types of property covered by each statute; (4) the types of defendants subject to punishment; (5) the types and number of remedies successful complainants
may receive; and (6) the types of plaintiffs who may initiate an enforcement suit. 14 A brief discussion of these factors appears in the
sections below.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976). Its coverage of housing discrimination is discussed in depth
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
11. See infra notes 46-48.
12. The Court held in Jones that an alleged victim of housing discrimination could sue
under § 1982 even though the same action may have been brought under the previously enacted Title VIII. The rationale for this is simple. Jones, 392 U.S. at 416, 417. Many instances
of discrimination in the sale and rental of housing might invoke suits that are appropriate
under either statute, but not both. See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.s. 229
(1969).
13. See generally Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, 648 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1980). See
also LEADERSHIP COUNCIL FOR METROPOLITAN OPEN COMMUNITIES, GUIDE TO PRACTICE
OPEN HOUSING LAW 19 (1974) [hereinafter cited as OPEN HOUSING LAW).

14. This article presents only a cursory review of the differences and similarities among
the statutes. For a more detailed analysis and review, see Aguilar, Developments in the Law, 15
HARP. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 29 (1980). See also OPEN HOUSING LAW, supra note 13, at 18.
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ProhibitiveDiscriminatory Practicesunder section 1982, Title
VIII and the Equal Protection Clause

The Supreme Court held in Jones that section 1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the selling or renting
of property and that the statute' 5 is a valid exercise of the power of
Congress to enforce the thirteenth amendment.' 6 The Court interpreted the language in section 1982 to include every racially-motivated refusal to sell or rent housing, whether among private parties
or under official sanctions. 17
Although the Court used sweeping language when interpreting
the meaning of section 1982, it was careful to note the limitations of
the statute. Specifically, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 deals only with
discrimination on the basis of race, not on the basis of religion, sexual preference, national origin, or sex. 8 Additionally, it does not
prohibit discrimination in financing or brokers' discriminatory practices-"blockbusting" and "racial

steering.'

9

Although section

1982 does not explicitly cover discriminatory misrepresentations of
non-availability or discriminatory terms and conditions, it is argued
by some that this "section would be practically nullified if it were not
construed to prohibit these practices."" °
Unlike the language in section 1982, the language in Title VIII
as amended by The Community Development and Housing Act2' is
specific. On the basis of race, color, national origin or sex, it is unlawful (1) to refuse to sell or rent to, or refuse to negotiate or deal
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
16. Jones, 392 U.S. at 413.
17. EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY, supra note 6, at 58.

18. Id.at 59.
19.

The Court's decision in Jones seems to leave open the possibility that § 1982 could be

applied to brokerage services; however, no liability has been found under § 1982 in several
instances where brokers have discriminated. See Note, Racial Steering. But see, Note, Housing and Section 1982." The Advisability of Extending the Statutory Mandate Beyond Acts of
TraditionalDiscrimination, 1975 DUKE L.J. 781, 799-800 (1975) for the view that § 1982 ap-

plies to brokers, in light of the holding in Jones that -[§19821 does not deal specifically with
discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with the sale or rental of a
dwelling." (footnote omitted).
20. See Morris & Powe, Constitutionaland Statutory Rights to Open Housing, 44 WASH. L.
REv. 1, 83 (1968).
21. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1968).
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with any person;22 (2) to discriminate in the terms or conditions for
buying or renting housing;2 3 (3) to advertise that persons of certain
races are preferred over persons of another race; 24 (4) to deny that
housing is available when, in fact, it is (misrepresentation); 2 (5) to
engage in "blockbusting";2 6 and (6) to deny or make different terms
on home loans or other financial assistance.27 Obviously, Title VIII
percent
coverage is broad. It is estimated, however, that only eighty
28
of America's private housing is covered. Sections 803b and 80729
permit some private dwellings 30 to be exempted from the coverage as
outlined in Section 804 of the 1974 Act.
Complainants who initiate a housing discrimination suit under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment necessarily
implicate the state in their allegations. Presumably, this clause outlaws all types of discrimination if federal, state or local officials fail
to establish some minimum rational basis for discriminating against
a particular class of housing complainants. 3 ' Although the number
of cases are few, complainants have initiated housing discrimination
suits with varying degrees of success pursuant to the equal protection
clause. These cases, however, typically concern discrimination in
22. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1976) (42 U.S.C. § 3604a) (1976).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1976) (42 U.S.C. § 3604b).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1976).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1976).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1976).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1976).

28. Single family houses owned by private individuals and purchased without the use of
real estate brokers or discriminatory advertising are exempted. If an individual owns one or
two other single family houses, only the sale of the house in which he lives within any two-year
period, is exempted provided that he does not employ a broker or discriminatory advertising.
Additionally, multifamily housing of four or fewer units is exempted if one is occupied by the
owner and discriminatory advertising is not used to sell it. Title VIII at § 3603(b) (1976).
29. Housing rented or sold by religious groups to their members, other than for commercial purposes, is exempted if the membership in the religious group is not restricted on account
of race, color, or national origin. Title VIII at § 3607 (1976).
30. "Dwelling" as used in 42 U.S.C. § 3604 is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b) as: "any
building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant land which is offered for sale or
lease for the construction or location thereon of any such building, structure, or portion
thereof."
31. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (a discussion of equal
protection); Montgomery County v. Fields Road Corporation, 386 A.2d 344 (1978) (a challenge to Montgomery County regulations requiring landlords with twenty-five or more rental
units to make quarterly reports on minority tenants and homeseekers).
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public rather than in private housing. 32
B. Proving Discriminationunder section 1982, Title VIII and the
Equal Protection Clause
Complainants who allege they are victims of housing discrimination have the burden of proving victimization and defendants' involvement. The proof required under section 1982 or Title VIII
differs substantially from that required when initiating an action
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Under section 1982, a complainant has to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.3 3 Among other things, this requires the
individual to show (1) that a private owner placed his property on
the open market for sale; (2) that plaintiff was willing and able to
purchase the property on terms specified by the owner; (3) that the
owner had notice of plaintiff's intention to buy; (4) that the owner
refused to sell the property to plaintiff; and (5) that no apparent reason other than plaintiffs race exists to explain defendant's refusal to
sell the property.34
To prove a case of racial discrimination under Title VIII, a
complainant must show that the private defendant's behavior had a
discriminatory effect. Once more, only a prima facie case is re32. See Clark v. Universal Builders, 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974) (discrimination in terms
and conditions of a sale is prohibited); Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation v.
Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (1975) (exclusionary zoning against low-income minority
homeseekers is not unconstitutional); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (exclusionary zoning against lower income homeseekers is not unconstitutional); Crow v. Brown, 457 F.2d 788
(5th Cir. 1972) (county official violated the fourteenth amendment when they refused to issue
building permits for low-rent public housing); Male v. Crossroads Associates, 469 F.2d 616 (2d
Cir. 1972) (equal protection clause was not violated when welfare recipients were refused consideration for apartments even though state action was involved); Citizens Committee for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 507 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1974) (no violation found when New York City
decided not to proceed with a middle to low-income housing project).
33. The definition of prima facie case is not identical across all circuits. See Phiffer v.
Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1980). However, in many circuits the
element of proof in § 1982 actions are deduced from elements of proof under Title VII. Under
this analysis, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that she/he is a member of a racial minority; (2) that
she/he applied for and was qualified to rent or purchase certain private property or housing;
(3) that she/he was rejected; and (4) that the housing or rental opportunity remained available
thereafter. See Wharton v. Knofel, 562 F.2d 550, 553-54 (8th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Anchor
Building Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1976); Harper v. Hutton, 594 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir.
1979); cf. Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979).
34. See Duckett v. Silberman, 568 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp.
151 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
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need no longer prove that the defendant
quired.35 "A plaintiff.
had no possible legal reason for not dealing with him, but only that
his race or national origin played some part in the refusal."36 Thus,
in any real estate transaction, consideration of race is an impermissible factor and "it cannot be brushed aside because it was neither the
sole reason for discrimination nor the total factor of discrimination." 7 [emphasis in the original]. It is worth reiterating here that
the provisions of Title VIII do not require a plaintiff to prove that
defendant acted with the specific intent of violating fair housing
laws; a discriminatory effect is only required."8
Unlike the requirement under section 1982 and Title VIII,
plaintiffs who initiate an equal protection suit must establish proof of
intentional racial discrimination under the constitutional standard of
proof as described in Arlington Heights v. MetropolitanHousing Development Corp.'9 This obviously increases the plaintiffs burden,
for racial motivation per se is difficult to prove and to identify.
C. Extensiveness of JudicialRemedies under section 1982, Title
VIII and the Equal Protection Clause
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 specifically authorizes courts to
grant injunctive ' and/or declaratory4 ' relief. It is silent with regard
35. Several courts of appeals have looked only at effects to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination tnder Title VIII, in cases of private discrimination and of local government
actions. See Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974) and United States v. City
of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1183-84 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); see
also infra
note 134-38.
36. See Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1971).
37. Id at, 349-50.
38. Id
39. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp, 429 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1977). The
Court noted that "official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a
racially disproportionate impact. (Id citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
(1976)). . . . 'Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an
invidious racial discrimination.' Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required
to show a violation of the equal protection clause. . . . Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 26466. The Court goes on to note that "the impact of the official action . .. may provide an
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than
race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation appears
neutral on its face." Id at 266.
40. EQUAL HoUsING OPPORTUNITY, supra note 6, at 60.
41. Jones, 392 U.S. at 414.
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to awarding damages. However, courts may fashion appropriate relief for successful plaintiffs in a section 1982 suit.4 2 Thus, plaintiffs
may receive both compensatory and punitive damages4 3 as well as
attorney's fees.' In addition to its allowance of monetary relief and
orders, a finding of discrimination in violation of section 1982 permits courts to order defendants to adopt and implement prospective
affirmative programs to correct the effects of their discriminatory
practices.4 5
In a suit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c), courts have
authority to award complainants actual damages and punitive damages not exceeding $1,000. Additionally, they may grant successful
plaintiffs all other remedies that a successful section 1982 plaintiff
might receive. 46 However, Title VIII and section 1982 can be distinguished in one major respect. A Title VIII plaintiff who chooses first
to file a complaint with HUD and pursue administrative remedies
before initiating a private suit under section 3610(a)47 may be limited to equitable relief. Punitive damages cannot be awarded. 48 Finally, under Title VIII courts may force an unsuccessful defendant
to adopt some affirmative action program to eliminate vestiges of
42. Id
43. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Morales v. Haines, 486
F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973); see also Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 294 (5th
Cir. 1970).
44. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
45. See United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 229-31 (5th Cir.
1971).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976). The precise language is:
The court may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order, and may award to the
plaintiff actual damages and not more than $1,000 punitive damages, together with
court costs and reasonable attorney fees in the case of a prevailing plaintiff. Provided, that the said plaintiff in the opinion of the Court is not financially able to
assume said attorney's fees.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1976) provides in part:
Any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a discriminatory housing
practice that is about to occur . . . may file a complaint with the Secretary ...
Upn receipt of such a complaint the Secretary shall furnish a copy of the same to the
person or persons who allegedly committed or are about to commit the alleged discriminatory housing practice. . . . If the Secretary decides to resolve the complaint,
he shall proceed to try to eliminate or correct the alleged discriminatory housing
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion ....
48. At least one court has ruled that the congressional intent was not to include damages
as a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a). Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
Thus a plaintiff who alleges discrimination under Title VIII should proceed under both 42
U.S.C. § 3610 and 42 U.S.C. § 3612.
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housing discrimination. 9
A successful plaintiff who initiates a suit under the equal protection clause is limited to declaratory and injunctive relief,5" although
under appropriate conditions the court may order the state to implement some affirmative action.5
II.

OVERVIEW OF STATE AND LOCAL FAIR HOUSING LAWS

Thirty-four states, the District of Columbia, and hundreds of
municipalities and counties have adopted fair housing statutes or ordinances. 2 As of 1979, HUD recognized only twenty-two states that
provided rights and remedies "substantially equivalent" 5 3 to those
provided under Title VIII. 4 Thirteen states5 5 have fair housing laws
which are not rated "substantially equivalent." And presently, the
District of Columbia fair housing ordinance is the single local ordinance listed as "substantially equivalent."5 6
The few states whose laws are equivalent to those of Title VIII
allow successful plaintiffs to receive remedies identical to those pro49. West Peachtree, 437 F.2d at 229.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
51. See Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), affd 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1972).
52. GUIDE TO FAIR HOUSING, supra note 2, at 57.
53. 24 C.F.R. § 115.3 (1979). "Substantial equivalency" is based upon the following criteria: (1) the state or local law must provide for an administrative enforcement body to receive
and process complaints, (2) the administrative enforcement body must have authority to investigate allegations of complaints and have the power to conciliate complaint matters; (3) the
state or local law may not place any excessive burdens on the complainant which might discourage the filing of complaints; (4) the state or local law must be sufficiently comprehensive in
its prohibitions so as to be an effective instrument in carrying out the purposes and intent of
Title VIII; and (5) the state or local law must not contain exemptions that are substantially less
than the coverage of Title VIII.
54. See 24 C.F.R. § 115.11 (1979). See also ALASKA STAT. § 18, COLO. REV. STAT. § 2434-502; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-35; IND. CODE § 22-9-1; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1015; Ky.
REV. STAT. § 344.010; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4551; MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 6, § 56
(Mickie/Law, Co-op); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 101; MINN. STAT. § 363; NEB. REV. STAT. § 20114; NEV. REV. STAT. § 118.010; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1
(West); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-1; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 298 (McKinney); OR. REV. STAT. § 659045; 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 951 (Purdon); R.I. GEN. LAws, § 34-37-5; VA. CODE § 36-95;
W. VA. CODE § 5-11-1; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101 (West).
55. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4601, GA. CODE ANN. § 113; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 515-1, IDAHO CODE § 67-5906; IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A; MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49B, § 1-28; Mo. REy. STAT. § 213.105; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 49-2-305; OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4112 (Page); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 20-13-20; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1467; WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.222.
56. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 321.
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vided by Title VIII. 7 These jurisdictions, however, are divided over
whether plaintiffs should receive damages for mental anguish and
humiliation." Federal courts, on the other hand, have awarded
plaintiffs damages for mental anguish and humiliation when suits
were initiated under section 1982 and/or Title VIII. 9
The types of coverage and relief provided by jurisdictions
whose laws are not "substantially equivalent" to Title VIII vary
greatly and space will not permit a thorough review of them. However, a review of California's, Maryland's, and Ohio's fair housing
laws clearly illustrates the types of discrimination prohibited and the
types of remedies awarded in "non-equivalent" states.
In California, discriminatory practices are outlawed under the
Health and Safety Code6" and the Unruh Civil Rights Act.6 Under
the former, discrimination in housing because of race is prohibited.6 2
The Act outlaws racial discrimination in commercial establishments.6 3 The Supreme Court of California has held that "the commission, on a finding of discrimination, may fashion remedies both
to correct unique cases of such practice as well as to curb its general
57. See supra note 46.
58. Jurisdictions which permit such damages are: West Virginia, Oregon, and New
Jersey. See West Virginia Human Rights Commission v. Pauley, 212 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1975);
Williams v. Joyce, 4 Or. App. 482, 479 P.2d 513 (1970); Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113,
253 A.2d 793 (1969); Zaharian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754
(1973). The following jurisdictions do not allow plaintiffs to receive damages for mental
anguish and humiliation: See Murphy v. Industrial Commission, 37 Wis. 2d 704, 155 N.W.2d
545, 157 N.W.2d 568 (1968); Iron Workers Local No. 67 v. Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758 (1971);
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Zamantakis, 387 A.2d 75 (1978).
59. See Adams v. Hempstead Heath, 426 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Branch v.
Deaver, P-H Eq. Opp. Hous. § 13,689 (N.D.Calif. 1974); Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462
(7th Cir. 1977); Franklin v. Agostinelli, P-H Eq. Opp. Hous. § 13,555 (W.D. Wash. 1971);
Burris v. Wilkins, 544 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1977); Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 643
F.2d at 553.
60. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35700 (West).
61. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 51 (West).
62. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, supra note 60, provides in relevant part: "The
practice of discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin,
or ancestry in housing accommodations is declared to be against public policy." See also Id.
§ 35720: "It shall be unlawful: (1) For the owner of any housing accommodation to discriminate against any person because of the race, color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin,
or ancestry of such person."
63. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 51 supra note 61, provides in pertinent part: "All persons
within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and, no matter what their. . . race, ...
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services
in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever."
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incidence. '6 4 In addition reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded
to the successful plaintiff.6 5
Maryland's fair housing statute is similar to California's in that
a complainant must commence his action with a state agency.6 6 The
court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for
further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if petitioner's rights have been prejudiced.67 Unlike California's, Maryland's law explicitly prohibits, on the basis of race, the refusal to sell
or rent, the refusal to negotiate, and misrepresentation in the sale or
rental of housing. 68 In addition, Maryland's "blockbusting" statute
declares it a misdemeanor "for any person, firm, corporation or association. . . to induce or attempt to induce another person to transfer
an interest in real property. . . by representations regarding the existing or potential proximity or real property owned, used or occupied by persons of any particular race .. ,"69
The general rule in Maryland is that if a statute provides a special form of remedy, the plaintiff must use that form rather than any
other.7" Therefore, if Maryland's Human Relation Commission
finds the defendant guilty of discrimination, it may issue a "cease
and desist" order and take affirmative action to effectuate the purposes of the particular statute involved. 7 '
The Ohio Civil Rights Commission has broad remedial authority to enforce the state law against discrimination and to keep
64. See Steams v. Fair Employment Practice Commission, 6 Cal. 3d 205, 490 P.2d 1155
(1971).
65. See People v. McKale, 83 Cal.3d 23, 148 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1978).
66. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 1-28 (1981).
67. Md. Admin. Proc. Act, art. 41, § 255(g) (1978).

68. MD.ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 22, provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory housing practice, because of race. . . for any
person having the right to sell, rent, lease, control, construct, or manage any dwelling
constructed or to be constructed, or any agent or employee of such person: (1) To
refuse to sell or rent after making a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the
sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling...
(4) To represent to any person, for reasons of discrimination, that any dwelling
is not available for inspection, sale or rental when such dwelling is in fact so
available.
69. MD.ANN. CODE art. 56, § 203A.

70. See Hartman v. Price George's Co., 264 Md. 320, 323, 286 A.2d 88 (1972), Soley v.
Maryland Commission on Human Relations, P-H Eq. Opp. Hous. § 16,501 (1976).
71. See Bulluck v. Pelham Woods Apartments, 283 Md. App. 505, 390 A.2d 1119 (1978).
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records indicating race.72 If the Commission finds any unlawful discriminatory behavior, it has authority to issue a "cease and desist"
order and to take further affirmative action.13 Unlike California's
and Maryland's laws, Ohio's statute74 explicitly prohibits discriminatory housing practice in many areas, for it is modeled after Title VIII
coverage.7 5 Although Ohio's law permits the Commission to issue
"cease and desist" orders, to award back pay, and to take affirmative
action,7 6 Ohio Supreme Court has held that the Commission is not
authorized to award humiliation, compensatory, and punitive damages to victims of discrimination.77
As mentioned at the outset, the District of Columbia has the
single ordinance rated "substantially equivalent" by HUD.78
Among other things, this means that the District's fair housing code
is "sufficiently comprehensive in its prohibitions... as to be an effective instrument in carrying out the purposes and intent of Title
VIII."" Courts have adopted this view and awarded the successful
plaintiff remedies in accord with 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c)."
In contrast, Pittsburgh's ordinancest is an example of a "nonequivalent" fair housing ordinance. An aggrieved individual is required to file his complaint with the local commission. Upon a finding of discrimination, the commission can issue a "cease and desist"
order and take affirmative action to end housing discrimination. 2
72. See Miller Properties, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, P-H Eq. Opp. Hous.

§ 15,016 (1972).
73. See OHIso REv. CODE ANN. §4112 (Page).
74. Id. § 4112.06(B).
75. See supra notes 22-27.
76. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05(G).
77. See Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Lysyi, 38 Ohio St.2d 217, 313 N.E.2d 3 (1974).
Note that Illinois, a "non-equivalent" sister state, allows plaintiffs to receive damages for
mental anguish and humiliation. See A.P. Green Services Division of Bigelow-Liptak Corp. v.
State of Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 19 Ill.
App. 3d 875, 312 N.E.2d 314
(1974).

78. See supra note 56.
79. See supra note 53.
80. See supra note 46; See also Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (awarding

injunctive relief); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (awarding injunctive
relief).
81. Pittsburg, Pa., sections 13(i) (1967).
82. Id The ordinance provides in pertinent part:
If upon all the evidence presented, the Commission finds that the respondent has

engaged in an unlawful practice, it shall state its findings of fact in writing and shall
issue (an) order in writing. . . .Such order may require the respondent to cease and
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled, however, that the Commission is not authorized to award compensatory and punitive damages,
3
attorney's fees, and damages for humiliation and mental anguish.
III.

ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL
FAIR HOUSING LAWS

The enforcement provisions of respective jurisdictions' fair
housing statutes and ordinances vary substantially. Some permit
private persons (private attorney generals)" as well as state and federal attorney generals to initiate a civil suit. Others only permit the
private attorney general to commence civil action. Moreover some
5
permit class action suits. This section examines who has standing
to sue under federal and state civil rights statutes and under local
ordinances.
desist from such unlawful practice and to take such affirmative action, including, but
not limited to ... the selling, renting or leasing of a housing accommodation or
housing accommodations upon equal terms and conditions and with such equal facilities, services and privileges, the tendering of money ... for the acquisition ... of
any housing accommodations ....
83. See City of Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations v. MacBeth, 37 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 636, 391 A.2d 1109 n.2 (1978) (Attorney fees cannot be awarded by the Commission). The
"language of Section 13(i) of the Pittsburgh Ordinance is nearly identical to § 959 of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act." See, e.g., Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v.
Straw, 387 A.2d 75 (1978) (commission has no authority to award compensatory damages for
mental anguish); Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Zamantakis, 387 A.2d 70
(1978) (commission cannot award compensatory damages for mental anguish and
humiliation).
84. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). The Court
noted that "the enormity of the task of assuring fair housing makes the role of the Attorney
General in the matter minimal. (T)he main generating force must be private suits in which,
the Solicitor General says, the complainants act not only on their own behalf but also 'as
private attorney general in vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the highest
priority.'" See also Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). The
awarding of attorney's fees is viewed as proper to insure that individual litigants act as "private
attorney generals."
85. EQUAL HousING OPPORTUNITY, supra note 6, at 79. Generally,
standing requires that the individual [sic] bringing the case must be injured in some
degree by the action of which he is complaining, so that he will have a personal stake
in the outcome as evidenced by some personal benefit to him from a favorable decision. And standing . . . also requires that the situation surrounding the claimed injury . . . be sufficiently concrete to enable the courts to determine and evaluate the
relevant facts and frame appropriate relief
See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) for a discussion of "prudential standing rules."
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Enforcement Roles under FederalStatutes and the Equal
Protection Clause

The Civil Rights Act of 1968 gives certain authority and power
to HUD, to the Attorney General and to private persons for effectuating the purpose of the Act. HUD has primary responsibility for
enforcing the law through affirmative action and programs of education and conciliation.16 If the Secretary of HUD finds discriminatory practices and is unable to get the defendant to cease voluntarily,
the Attorney General may be asked to commence legal action
and/or commence other appropriate action .8
Title VIII authorizes the Attorney General to initiate an independent housing discrimination suit. This authority is given
whenever "the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that
any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice""8
of housing discrimination. Remedies are limited to preventive relief,
permanent or temporary injunction, restraining orders or other
orders.8 9
A victim of housing discrimination in violation of Title VIII
may commence legal action pursuant to either of two enforcement
sections. One section 90 requires a complaint to be filed with and
processed by the Secretary of HUD. Another section 9 ' authorizes a
civil action independently of HUD's or the Attorney General's involvement. Courts have held that these actions create independent
causes as well as provide for separate remedies. 92
Any black or white victim of discrimination has standing to sue
86. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, TITLE ViI1 LEGAL
D.C. 7 (1978) [hereinafter cited as PROCEDURE MANUAL]. See also supra note 47.
87. Id at 8.
88. Title ViII 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976).
89. Id. See also U.S. v. Long, 537 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir. 1975) (re-affirming the awarding of
preventive relief and other equitable remedies when the Attorney General initiates a suit but
PROCEDURE MANUAL, WASHINGTON,

barring the recovery of monetary damages for victims of discrimination).
90. See supra note 88.
91. Id
92. See Crim v. Glover, 338 F. Supp. 823, 825 (S.D Ohio 1972). "Plaintiffs have the right

to bring a suit in federal district court alleging racial discrimination in the rental of housing
under Section 812, before exhausting or attempting to exhaust the remedies provided for in
Section 810" Id; Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) (exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not a necessary prerequisite for bringing a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 3612).
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under these enforcement provisions.9 3 For example, the right of a
white victim to sue has been upheld when a white landlord blocked
94
his attempt to sublease an apartment to a prospective black tenant.
Additionally, whites have been granted the right to sue when discriminatory policies exclude blacks and other minorities from condominiums, cooperatives, and other dwellings."
In addition to initiating a suit under Title VIII, an individual
may commence an independent civil action pursuant to section
1982.96 The same authority is not granted to federal administrative
agencies nor to the Attorney General. 97 The 1866 Civil Rights Act
permits only private victims of discrimination to commence legal action. Any person seeking relief must present facts showing that challenged practices harmed him and that he personally would benefit
from the court's intervention.9" The same requirement applies to
persons initiating a housing discrimination suit under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 99
B. Enforcement Provisions Under State FairHousing Laws
The enforcement provisions of states' fair housing laws vary
widely from state to state.1°° Private persons may have the sole authority to enforce the law or the provision may be enforced by the
state and by private victims of discrimination. Typically, stateswhose laws are either "substantially equivalent" to Title VIII or less
equivalent-empower administrative agencies to receive complaints,
conduct investigations, and attempt to resolve the conflicts through
93. See OPEN HOUSING LAW, supra note 13 at 20. See also supra note 85.
94. See Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1971).

95. See Trafficante, supra note 83; see also Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v.
Jenna Rosales, 429 F. Supp. 486 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (coalition of homeowners had standing to
contest alleged acts of racial steering by realtors).
96. See supra note 12.
97. See EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY, supra note 6, at 59.
98. See Warth v. Seldin, supra note 85. The Court ruled that organizations, low income
minorities, and taxpayers who were not directly affected by an alleged discriminatory zoning
law did not have standing to challenge the law. See also Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571, 589, 612
(2d Cir. 1976). A divided court sitting en banc reversed its earlier decision in an exclusionary
zoning suit and denied standing to a non-resident plaintiff who had not personally suffered any
injury from the alleged discriminatory actions.
99. See generally, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation,
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
100. GUIDE TO FAIR HOUSING, supra note 2, at 6.
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conciliation." I Some states permit agencies, after a finding of probselling or renting a dwellable cause, to enjoin the respondent10 from
2
dispute.
of
subject
the
is
ing which
California's fair housing law,' 0 3 for example, "specially empowers the Fair Employment Practice Commission to prevent discrimination in housing.' 4 The district attorney, however, can also
to the code. 0 5 Similar arrangements are
initiate an action pursuant
06
found in other states.1
IV.

JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VIII AND PROPOSALS TO
STRENGTHEN ITS ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS

The ruling in Jones v. AlfredH. Mayer and the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 has been the law for fifteen years yet housing discrimination
is still rampant. The opinion of many legal scholars and practitioners is that Title VIII enforcement provisions are not effective enough
to end discrimination in housing. 07 Similarly, vigorous enforcement
of state and local fair housing laws tends to be the exception rather
than the rule.' 8 Among other reasons, enforcement under Title VIII
has not been successful because (1) HUD cannot issue "cease and
desist" orders or institute civil action on its own behalf, and (2) the
statute of limitation for initiating a suit is too short-180 days.' 9
Enforcement efforts at the state and local levels are poor because the
majority of agencies are underfunded and understaffed." 0 Moreover, state agencies are typically legally incompetent."'I As of this
writing two competing bills have been introduced in the Senate.
101.

Id

102. Id
103. See supra note 60.
104. See Stearnes v. Fair Employment Practice Commission, supra note 64, at n.3.
105. See People v. McKale, supra note 65.

106. See supra note 54.
107. See EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY, supra note 6, at 60; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT.

AN ANALYSIS

OF REMEDIES OBTAINED THROUGH

LITIGATION OF FAIR HOUSING CASES Title VIII and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 49 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as REMEDIES]; see supra note 2, at 4; see also Note, Is the U.S. Committed to
Fair Housing? Enforcement of the Fair HousingAct Remains a CrucialProblem, 29 CATH. U.
L. REV. 641, 661 (1980).
108. See supra note 2, at 6.

109. REMEDIES, supra note 107, at 49.
110. See supra note 108.
111. Id
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These bills would revise the enforcement provisions of Title VIII.
The most relevant sections of each bill are discussed below.
The FairHousing Amendment Act of 1983

A.

A congressional bipartisan coalition has proposed the Fair
Housing Amendment Act of 1983-Senate bill S. 1220.' 12 The purpose of the bill is to provide a speedy, fair, and inexpensive adjudicaalleging denial of housing as well as for
tion process for the person
13
the person charged.
Among its other purposes, S. 1220 would attempt to enforce Title VIII as follows: (1) victims of discrimination or aggrieved persons"14 would continue to choose between filing an administrative
complaint with HUD"' and initiating a private suit in federal or
state courts; 1 6 (2) hearings would be held before administrative law
judges,"' those selected by a Presidentially appointed Fair Housing
Review Commission; 1 8 (3) HUD would have to refer suits, however,
to state and local administrative agencies if the discrimination arose
in areas where fair housing laws are "substantially equivalent" 9 to
federal law;' 20 (4) the Department of Justice would continue to be
responsible for discriminatory "pattern or practice" suits and for
cases that pose an issue of general public importance or novel questions of law;' 2 ' (5) administrative law judges would assess and award
damages and civil penalties;' 2 2 and (6) HUD would have powers to
112. S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), This bill is very similar to bills S. 570, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1973, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981); S. 506, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1980) and H.R. 5200, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) which narrowly missed passage in the wanning days of the 96th Congress.
113. S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 6153 (1983).
114. S. 1220, § 802(i), 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 6155 (1983).

" 'Aggrieved

person' is defined as those both directly and indirectly affected. This. . .includes so-called
'testers' who as the Supreme Court has recently held, have the same Title VIII right as others
in the community to receive truthful information about the availability of housing." Id at
6158.

115. Id. § 810(a)(1).
116. Id § 812(a)(1).
117 Id § 808(2)(D).
118. Id. § 808(2)(A).
119. See supra note 53.

120. S. 1220, § 810(a)(3), 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 6157 (1983).
121. Id

§ 813(a).

122. Id § 811 (a). It is important to note that judicial review of final administrative orders
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investigate fair housing violations." 3
A very important feature of S. 1220 concerns the standard of
proof required to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. During the introduction of the bill, supporters stated unequivocally that "the standard of proof necessary to establish illegal
discrimination [would] remain the same as current case law."' 24
impact" standard 25

This means that the "effects" or "disparate
would be used to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in
private housing, and the "intent" standard 26 would be used to establish aprimafacie case2 of racially-motivated zoning involving local
government officials.' 1
B.

The EqualAccess to Housing Act of 1983

A careful review of the Equal Access to Housing Act of 1983Senate bill S.140 12-reveals that its purpose and enforcement provisions differ significantly from those of the Fair Housing Amendment Act. Although one purpose of Senate bill S.140 is to "enhance
the ability of the Federal Government to enforce Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968," 129 which parallels the intent of Senate bill
S.1220, the Equal Access Act-unlike S. 1220-is also designed to
prevent HUD from using Title VIII as an "instrument of social engiis possible. Judicial review of the Fair Housing Review Commission may proceed in the
appropriate court of appeals. Id § 81 1(c).
123. Id § 810(a)(l).
124. See supra note 113, at 6162 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
125. This simply means using "statistical or other evidence of objective fact which, if established, warrants an inference that discrimination exists," See Note, Is the U.S. Committed to
FairHousing? Enforcement ofthe FairHousingAct Remains a CrucialProblem, 29 CATH. U.
L. REV. 641, 656 n.103 (1980). See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-36
(1970).
126. See supra note 39.
127. See, e.g., Village of Belwood v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1978)
(official conduct and exclusionary zoning on the basis of race); El Cortez Heights Residents
and Property Owner's Association v. Tucson Housing Authority, 457 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1969)
(public officials encouraging discriminatory site selection for public housing on the basis of
race); and Cole v. Housing Authority of City of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970) (discriminatory tenant selection based on race); S. 1220 would also require landlords to allow
reasonable modifications in housing in order to make it substantially equal in its access by
handicapped persons. Additionally, it would prevent landlords from discriminating on the
basis of familial status. See supra note 120, at 6158.
128. S. 140, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
129. S. 140, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 625 (1983).
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neering."' 301 To achieve both goals, Senate bill S.140 would transfer
all administrative responsibility from the Department of Housing
and Urban Development to the Department of Justice. 131 A new

conciliation process would be established in the Justice Department
which would resolve controversies informally.' 3 2
The Equal Access to Housing Act differs from the Fair Housing
Amendment Act in another major respect. It places considerably
more emphasis on private litigation and on judicial enforcement of
fair housing laws, a feature that provides no significant improvement
in the enforcement provisions outlined in the Civil Rights Act of
1968.133 First, the Attorney General must attempt to resolve complaints by a process of conciliation; however, if conciliation fails, the
Department of Justice may initiate a civil action' 3 4 in federal court
on behalf of an aggrieved person 31 or an alleged victim of racial
discrimination. Secondly, if prompt judicial action is necessary, the
Attorney General may seek appropriate temporary or preliminary
relief in federal court pending final disposition of the case. 136 Finally, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in an appropriate federal district court if there is reasonable cause to believe that
persons are engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination or if
the case represents an issue of general public importance.""
That more judicial action is likely to occur under the Equal Ac130. When introducing S. 140, Senator Hatch stated:
The experience of HUD in enforcing the act (Title VIII) over a period of years has
demonstrated a fundamental conflict between its obligation to fairly administer the
law and itsprimarymission to set national housingpolicy. Enforcement of Title VIII

is, first and foremost, a matter of insuring compliance with the law; too often it has

Id

been used by HUD as an instrument of social engineeringpolicy." (emphasis added).

131.

S. 140, § 810 (a), 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 627 (1983).

132. Id § 812(b).
133. See Part III of this article.
134. S. 140, § 812(c), 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 628 (1983).
135. Id. § 802(i). Section 802(i) provides in pertinent part:
'Aggrieved person' includes any person whose bona fide attempt or bona fide offer to
purchase, sell, lease, or rent, or whose bona fide attempt to obtain financing for a
dwelling has been denied on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, or natu-

ral origin, or made subject to terms of purchase, sale, lease, rental ....
Unlike the Fair Housing Amendment Act, this bill does not include all "testers" under its
definition of an "aggrieved person." Senate bill S.140 "would limit the use of testers to those
instances in which such a practice was necessary to confirm an alleged violation of the act."
Id at 626 (statement of Senator Hatch).
136. Id § 812(a).
137. Id § 814(a).
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cess Act is reflected in the provision outlining private enforcement.
An aggrieved person may commence a civil action in an appropriate
federal district court or state court.138 In addition, the Department
of Justice may give the victims of discrimination not more than one
thousand dollars for legal fees and other expenses of initiating a civil
action. 139
Unlike the Fair Housing Act, the Equal Access Act places a
substantial burden on complainants by requiring them to prove a
prima facie case of invidious discrimination in private dwellings.
Specifically, "the standard of proof in identifying discrimination
The sponsor of
under Title VIII (would be) an intent standard.'
Senate bill S. 140 stressed that the intent standard is more appropriate than the effects standard 141 for several reasons: (1) the "use of the
effects test. . . carries with it tremendous potential for involving the
Federal Government in zoning and land-use affairs that have always
been the prerogative of state and local governments"; (2) the "use of
the effects test by HUD and the Civil Rights Division of the Justice
Department has been the basis by which they have sought to impose
their own notions of proper racial balance upon communities which
have had no intent or purpose of discriminating against protected
groups"; and (3) "the intent test . . . allows courts to consider the
totality of circumstances, including evidence of racially disparate
effects."' 42
Although more will be said about requiring aggrieved persons
to prove the fourteenth amendment's prima facie case of racial discrimination 43 in private housing, an important point should be
138. Id § 813(a) (1).
139. Id § 812(b).
140. Id at 626.
141.

See supra note 125.

142. See supra note 131, at 626.
143.

See, e.g., Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252, 254 (1977). The City of Arlington Heights

refused to rezone a tract of land from a single-family to a multiple-family classification, after
discovering that a proposed project would be racially integrated. Plaintiffs filed a private suit,
alleging that the denial was based on race. The Supreme Court ruled that the "'rezoning denial
was motivated not by racial discrimination but by a desire to protect property values and
maintain the Village's zoning plan." The Court noted that official behavior (state action) will
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact.
Suits initiated under the equal protection clause require plaintiffs to prove that public officials
intended to discriminate on the basis of race. Failure to overcome the burden requires lower
courts to rule in favor of community officials, for municipalities are given considerable discretion under their police powers.
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made at this juncture. Supporters of Senate bill S. 140 suggest that
the "Equal Access Act would reaffirm more strongly than ever . . .
this Nation's commitment to the elimination of discriminatory (private) housing policies." 1' (emphasis added). Yet, some would require alleged victims of private housing discrimination to prove that
racial discrimination was intentional-a task whose difficulty has
been repeatedly demonstrated. 45 The ostensible rationale for this
requirement that complainants prove purposeful racial discrimination is that the effect standard would increase the likelihood of the
Attorney General initiating exclusionary zoning and land-use
suits. 146 Such an argument, however, is flaccid for two important
reasons.
First, the Fair Housing Amendment Act-S. 1220-as well as
the Equal Access to Housing Act would allow the Attorney General
to pursue cases which pose issues of "general public importance" or
"novel questions of law."' 4 7 These phrases are very broad and they
permit the Attorney General to exercise a considerable amount of
discretion. Therefore, under either act, the Attorney General could
conceivably initiate discriminatory zoning and land-use suits which
involve state and local governments. Second, a careful examination
of alleged racially-motivated exclusionary zoning suits shows that
(1) federal and state courts are currently requiring the overwhelming
majority of plaintiffs to prove intentional discriminatory zoning and
(2) local communities are overwhelmingly successful in defending
their zoning policies. 48 Thus, requiring aggrieved persons to prove
144. See supra note 131, at 625 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
145. See infra note 148.

146. See supra note 131.
147. See supra notes 121 and 137.

148. The author tried to find every exclusionary zoning case based on race between 1970
and 1981. Twenty-one suits were found. Given that zoning includes state action, complainants are required to prove purposeful discrimination pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Surprisingly, local communities are very successful in defending the zoning policies in sixtyseven per cent of the cases. On appeal, they are even more successful. See Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation v. Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252 (1976); Park
View Heights Corporation v City of Blackjack, 605 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1979); Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1978); Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571 (2nd
Cir. 1975); United Farmworkers of Florida Housing Project v. City of Delray Beach, Florida,
493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974);
Warth v. Seldin, 495 F.2d 1187 (2nd Cir. 1974); Dailey v. City of Lawton, Oklahoma, 425 F.2d

1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Kennedy Park Home Assn. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2nd
Cir. 1970); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, California, 424
F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. City of Parma, Ohio, 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio
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intentional racial discrimination inprivate housing suits causes one
to question whether supporters of Senate bill S. 140 are truly committed to eliminating racial discrimination in private housing.
V.

AN EXAMINATION OF SOME UNEXAMINED PITFALLS
ASSOCIATED WITH PRIVATE LITIGATION

In Part III, it was reported that current enforcement procedures
under Title VIII allow an aggrieved person to either file a complaint
with HUD or initiate a civil action in an appropriate federal district
or state court. Supporters of both Senate bill S. 1220 and S. 140
agree that the conciliation process in the Department of Housing and
Urban Development is an inadequate enforcement method. However, supporters of Senate bill S.140 would continue
to encourage
149
victims of private discrimination to use the CoUrtS.
Supporters of the Fair Housing Amendment Act-Senate bill S.
1220-suggest that the initiation of private suits should not be the
major feature of Title VIII enforcement provisions. Some assert that
"it is costly and time-consuming to go to federal district court, and
delays of up to two years are not uncommon."' 5 0 More important,
"once in court, there is no guaranteeof success."' s (emphasis added.)
In this section we will attempt to show why alleged victims of
private discrimination should not be encouraged to use the courts. A
review of private suits revealed that the likelihood of an aggrieved
person receiving remedial action is contingent on factors which have
little to do with the merits of his case and on variables' 5 2 over which
1980); Irby v. Easttown Township, P-H Eq. Opp. Hous. § 15, 231 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Johnson v.
County of Chester, 413 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Cornelius v. City of Parma, 374 F.
Supp. 730 (N.D.Ohio 1974); Yarbrough v. City of Warren, 383 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Mich.
1974); Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 370 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Morales v.
Haines, P-H Eq. Opp. Hous. § 13543 (N.D. Ill.
1972); Planning for People Coalition v. The
County of DuPage, Illinois, P-H Eq. Opp. Hous. § 13,753 (N.D. 111.1971); Sisters of Providence of St. Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston, P-H Eq.Opp. Hous. § 13,531 (N.D. Ill.
1971); UAW v. Township of Mahwah, 1972 E. Q. Hous. (P-H) 1 16,204 (Super. Ct. NJ. 1972);
Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor and Council of Carteret, 1976 E.Q. Hous.
(P-H) 1 16,502 (Super. Ct. N.J. 1976).
149. See supra notes 134-38.
150. Supra note 113, at 6164 (statement of Sen. Glenn).
151. Id
152. See, e.g., 339 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D.IU.1972) (Race: whites have standing to sue as well
as blacks); 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 939 (1974) (Types of defendants:
realtors' behaviors qualify as a pattern or practice of discrimination); 537 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir.
1975) (Types of plaintiffs: The Attorney General can initiate a suit); 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D.
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he has little control. These problems would be solved with the enactment of the Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1983-Senate bill S.
1220.
A.

Methodology and Data Collection

Several sources' 5 3 were consulted in an effort to find every litigated case of racial discrimination in private housing.' 5 4 Two-hundred and one cases were found: forty-seven state cases,15 5 eightyKy. 1976) (Types of property: certain properties are exempted from coverage under Title
VIII); 648 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1980) (Types of commercial transactions: § 1982 insures that all
citizens can purchase, sell, lease, hold or convey all property, including rental of office space);
501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974) (Types of discrimination: No difference exists between the traditional form of discrimination and the exploitation of a discriminatory situation); 499 F.2d 1197
(6th Cir. 1974) (Types of legal action: class certification is not awarded simply because it is
pleaded); 350 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D. N.C. 1972) (Legal bases of suits: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 810,
and 812 may be pursued concurrently).
153. Cases were selected from the U.S. Supreme Court Reporter, Federal Reporter, Federal Supplement; state reporters (both official and West reports); Prentice-Hall Equal Opportunity in Housing Reporter, and Mead Data Central Lexis Retrieval System.
154. Cases dealing with the alleged discriminatory conduct of real estate appraisers, redlining, and discrimination by financial institutions are not included here. These forms of discrimination will be the topic of a forthcoming paper, for they involve more complex issues such as
tax and banking laws. See United States v. American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 442
F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (discriminatory practices by property appraisers); Harrison. v.
Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., P-H Eq. Opp. Hous. § 15,202 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (discrimination in
"terms or conditions" of a loan); Harper v. Union Savings Association, P-H Eq. Opp. Hous.
§ 15,203 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (discrimination in "terms or conditions" of a loan); and Laufman v.
Oakley Building and Loan Company, P-H Eq. Opp. Hous. § 13,780 (S.D. Ohio 1976)
("redlining").
155. See Burks v. Poppy Construction Company, 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313 (1962);
Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825 (1967); People v. McKale, 83 Cal. App. 3d
623, 148 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1978); Stearns v. Fair Employment Practice Commission, 6 Cal. 3d
205, 490 P.2d 1155 (1971); Wilson Builders v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 2d 77, 33 Cal. Rptr. 621
(1963); Winchell v. English, 62 Cal. App. 3d 125, 133 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1976); Connecticut Commission on Human Rights v. Evergreen, Corporation, 1975 E. Q. Hous. (P-H) § 15,046 (C.P.
1975); Filippo v. Real Estate Commission of D.C., 223 A.2d 268 (D.C. 1966); Georgia Real
Estate Commission v. Home, 141 Ga. App. 226, 233 S.E.2d 16 (1972); Bell Realty and Insurance Agency v. Chicago Commission of Human Relations, 130 Ill. App. 2d 1072, 266 N.E.2d
769 (1971); Indiana Civil Rights Commission v. Holman, 380 N.E.2d 1281 (1978); Bulluck v.
Pelham Woods Apts. 283 Md. App. 505, 390 A.2d 1119 (1978); Maryland Commission on
Human Relations v. Malakoff, 273 Md. 214, 329 A.2d 8 (1974); Katz v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 365 Mass. 357, 312 N.E.2d 182 (1974); Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination v. Franzaroli, 357 Mass. 112, 256 N.E.2d 311 (1970);
McKibbin v. Michigan Corporation and Securities Commission, 369 Mich. 69, 119 N.W.2d
557 (1963); State of Minnesota v. Bergeron, 290 Minn. 351, 187 N.W.2d 680 (1971); Gray v.
Serrato Builders, Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 297, 265 A.2d 404 (1970); David v. Vesta Company, 45
N.J. Super. 301, 212 A.2d 345 (1965); Hughes v. Cypress Gardens Apartments, Inc., 118 N.J.
Super. 374, 288 A.2d 31 (1970); Cook v. Mangum, 38 A.D.2d 848, 330 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1972);
Italiano v. New York State Executive Department of Human Rights, 36 A.D.2d 1009, 321
N.Y.S.2d 422 (1971); Kramarsky v. Stahl Management & Macon Estates, 92 Misc. 2d 1030,
401 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1977); Merrill v. State Division of Human Rights, 37 N.Y.2d 844, 340

HOWARD LAW JOURNN4L

[Vol. 27

nine federal district cases, 156 and sixty-five appellate and Supreme
N.E.2d 470 (1975); Peninsula Apartment, Inc. v. New York State Division of Human Rights,
35 A.D.2d 673, 316 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1970); State Division of Human Rights v. AOS Realty
Corp., 36 A.D.2d 970, 321 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1971); State Division of Human Rights v. Ganley,
327 N.Y.S.2d 37 A.D.2d 983, 327 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1971); State Division of Human Rights v.
Glick, 35 A.D.2d 738, 316 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1970); State Division of Human Rights v. Luppino,
35 A.D.2d 107, 313 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1970); State Divison of Human Rights v. Ruiz, 327 N.Y.S.2d
37 A.D.2d 861, 327 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1971); State Division of Human Rights v. Wagner, 39
N.Y.2d 865, 352 N.E.2d 134 (1976); 300 Gramatan Avenue Associates v. State Division of
Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 179, 379 N.E.2d 1183 (1978); City of New York v. Camp Construction Co., 51 Misc. 2d 50, 272 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1966); Commission on Human Rights v. Hardenbrook Realty Corp., 57 Misc. 2d 430, 292 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1968); Commission on Human Rights
v. Knox Realty Corporation, 56 Misc. 2d 806, 240 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1968); Homes v. Board of
Adjustment, 23 Ohio Misc. 211 (1970); Williams v. Joyce, 4 Or. App. 482, 479 P.2d 513 (1971);
City of Pittsburgh Commission on Human NRelations v. Macbeth, 37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 636,
391 A.2d 1109 (1978); Midland Heights Homes v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 17 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 563, 333 A.2d 516 (1975); Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Elgart,
4 Pa. Commw. 616, 287 A.2d 887 (1972); Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v.
Straw, 478 Pa. 463, 387 A.2d 75 (1978); Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Zamantakis, 478 Pa. 454, 387 A.2d 70 (1978); Speare & Van Buren Homes, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 502; 328 A.2d 570 (1974); Hollis v. Rody, 81
Wash. 2d 88, 500 P.2d 97 (1972); West Virginia Human Rights Commission v. Pauley, 212
S.E.2d 77 (1973); Ford v. Wisconsin Real Estate Examining Board, 48 Wis. 2d 91, 179 N.W.2d
786 (1970).
156. See Concerned Tenants Association v. Indian Trail Apartments, 496 F. Supp. 522
(N.D. Ill. 1980); Dreher v. Rare Management, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 930 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Sherman Park Community Association v. Wanwatusa Realty Company, 486 F. Supp. 838 (E.D.
Wis. 1980); Braunstein v. Dwelling Manager, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Patel v.
Holley House Motels, 483 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Ala. 1979); Village of Bellwood v. Dwayne Realty, 482 F. Supp. 1321 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Bradley v. John M. Brabham Agency, 463 F. Supp. 27
(D.S.C. 1978); Normal v. St. Louis Concrete Pipe Co., 447 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. Mo. 1978);
Smith v. Woodhollow Apartments, 463 F. Supp. 16 (W.D. Okla. 1978); United States v. Reece,
457 F. Supp. 43 (D. Mont. 1978); Wainwright v. Allen, 461 F. Supp. 293 (N.W.N.D. 1978);
Young v. Parkland Village, 460 F. Supp. 67 (D. Md. 1978); Domingo v. New England Fish
Co., 445 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Wash. 1977); Dyer v. Schecter, 1977 E. 0. Hous. (P-H) § 15,233
(N.D. Ohio 1977); Hughes v. Repko, 429 F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Johnson v. Albritton,
424 F. Supp. 456 (M.D. La. 1977); Morehead v. Lewis, 132 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Ill. 1977);
United States v. Real Estate One, 433 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Wheatley Heights
Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Rosales Co., 429 F. Supp. 486 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Bishop v.
Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Carpenter v. Bakir, 1976 E. 0. Hous. (P-H)
§ 13,767 (E.D. Va. 1976); Elazer v. Wright, 1976 E. 0. Hous. (P-H) § 15,197 (S.D. Ohio 1976);
Fair Housing Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing, 422
F. Supp. 1071 (D. N.J. 1976); Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976); Lee v. Minnock, 417 F. Supp. 436 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Parker v. Shonfeld, 409 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Cal.
1976); Sumlin v. Brown, 420 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Todd v. Lutz, 1976 E. 0. Hous. (PH) § 13,787 (W.D. Pa. 1976); United States v. Alexander & Cloutier Realty Co., 1976 E. 0.
Hous. (P-H) § 13,570 (S.D. Fla. 1976); United States v. Berg Enterprises, 1976 E. 0. Hous. (PH) § 13,773 (S.D. Fla. 1976); United States v. L & H Land Corp., 407 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. Fla.
1976); Wharton v. Knefel, 415 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Clemons v. Punck, 402 F. Supp.
863 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Howard v. W.P. Bill Atkinson Enterprise, 412 F. Supp. 610 (W.D. Okla.
1975); Huffine v. Dean, 1975 E. 0. Hous. (P-H) § 13,728 (S.D. Ohio, 1975); Lyles v. Hampton,
1975 E. 0. Hous. (P-H) § 13,738 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Smith v. Anchor Building Corp., 397 F.
Supp. 256 (E.D. Mo. 1975); United States v. Dittmar Company, 1975 E. 0. Hous. (P-H)
§ 13,570 (E.D. Va. 1975); United States v. Hilton-Sykes Rental Agency, 1975 E. 0. Hous.
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Court decisions.15 7
(P-H) § 13,727 (M.D. Il. 1975); Walker v. Fox, 395 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Zuch v.
Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Branch v. Denver, 1974 E. 0. Hous. (P-H)
§ 13,689 (N.D. Calif. 1974); Collins v. Spasojcevic, 1974 E. 0. Hous. (P-H) § 13,654 (N.D. 111.
1974); Fort v. White, 383 F. Supp. 949 (D. Conn. 1974); Hughes v. Dyer, 378 F. Supp. 1305
(W.D. Mo. 1974); Mason v. Ward, 1974 E. 0. Hous. (P-H) § 13,688 (S.D. Ohio 1974); Matthews v. Mayne, 1974 E. 0. Hous. (P-H) § 13,660 (D. Md. 1974); United States v. Henshaw
Brothers, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Va. 1974); United States v. Saroff, 377 F. Supp. 352
(E.D. Tenn. 1974); Flowers v. Santefort Real Estate, 1973 E. 0. Hous. (P-H) § 13,622 (N.D.
Ill. 1974); Hollins v. Kraas, 369 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Johnson v. Zaremba, 381 F.
Supp. 165 (N.D. 111.1973), Logan v. Carmack, 368 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Marshall v.
Pendley, 1973 E. 0. Hous. (P-H) § 13,615 (N.D. Ga. 1973); McNeil v. P-N & S, Inc._ 372 F.
Supp. 658 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Riddick v. Hill, 1973 E. 0. Hous. (P-H) § 13,628 (N.D. Calif.
1973); Sanborn v. Wagner, 354 F, Supp. 291 (D. Md 1973); United States v. Westside Building
Co., 382 F. Supp. 148 (C.D. Cal. 1973); United States v. Youritan Construction Co., 370 F.
Supp. 643 (N.D. Calif. 1973); Adams v. Hempstead Heath Co., 426 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); Cowan v. Smart & Gabe, Inc., 1972 E. 0. Hous. (P-H) § 13,562 (N.D. 111. 1972); Crim v.
Glover, 338 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Fred v. Kokinokos, 347 F. Supp. 942 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); Hall v. Freitas, 343 F. Supp. 1099 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Kelly v. Armbrust, 351 F. Supp. 867
(D.N.D. 1972); Steger v. Ognio, 1972 E. 0. Hous. (P-H) § 13,558 (M.D. Tenn. 1972); United
States v. Gilman, 341 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp.
1130 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United States v. Real Estate Development Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776
(N.D. Miss. 1972); Williamson v. Hampton Management Company, 339 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D.
Ill. 1972); Wright v. Kaine Realty, 352 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Young v. AAA Realty
Company of Greensboro, 350 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D. N.C. 1972); Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp.
1033 (N.D. Tex. 1971); Brown v. Blake & Bane, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1971);
Franklin v. Agnostinelli, 1971 E. 0. Hous. (P-H) § 13,555 (N.D. Wash. 1971); United States v.
Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. Ga. 1971); James v. Haller, 320 F. Supp.
397 (N.D. Ga. 1970); McLaurin v. Brusturis, 320 F. Supp. 190 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Brown v.
LaDuca, 307 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Brown v. State Realty Company, 304 F. Supp.
1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969); Contract Buyers
League v. F & F Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Harris v. Jones, 296 F. Supp.
1082 (D. Mass. 1969); Jones v. Sciacia, 297 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. Mo. 1969); United States v.
Knippan and Day Real Estate, Inc,, 298 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. La. 1969); United States v.
Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969); Walker v. Pointer, 304 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex.
1969); Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, 289 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Newbern v.
Lake Lorelei, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
157. See Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, (1968); Houston v. Benttree, Ltd. 637 F.2d 739
(10th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Snyder, 639 F.2d 316 (6th Cir. 1981); Marable v. H. Walker Associates, 644 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1981); Blockman v. Sandalwood Apartments, 613 F.2d 169 (7th
Cir. 1980); Coles v. Havens Realty Co., 633 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1980); McDonald v. Verble, 622
F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1980); Phiffen v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.
1980); Dillion v. AFBIC Development Corp., 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1979); Robinson v. 12
Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979); Taylor v. Fletcher Properties, Inc., 592 F.2d
244 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Rent-a-Homes Systems of Illinois, Inc., 602 F.2d 795 (7th
Cir. 1979); Duckett v. Silberman, 568 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d
487 (9th Cir. 1978); Green v. Ten Eyck, 572 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1978); Miller v. Poretsky, 595
F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Payne v. Bracher, 582 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1978); Samuel v. Benedict,
573 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1978); Sandford v. R.L. Coleman Realty Co., Inc., 573 F.2d 173 (4th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1978); Warner v. Perrino, 585 F.2d
171 (6th Cir. 1978); Burris v. Wilkins, 544 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1977); Connell v. Shoemaker, 555
F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1977); Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1977); Hobbs v. Turner, 563
F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1977); Hodge v. Seiler, 558 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Jamestown Center-In-The-Grove Apartments, 557 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. War-
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The primary objective of this review is to show how a few selected independent variables'5 8 affect the disposition of private discrimination in housing suits, the dependent variable. 59 Obviously,
aggrieved persons do not or should not expect to win every suit simply because they complain of alleged racial discrimination in private
housing. Many persons are unsuccessful and will continue to be unsuccessful because of procedural problems and failure to establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination.'" ° The central hypothewick Mobile Homes Estates, 558 F.2d 194 (4th Cir. 1977); Singleton v. Gendason, 545 F.2d
1224 (9th Cir. 1976); Sorenson v. Raymond, 532 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1976); Topic v. Circle
Realty, 532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., Inc., 537 F.2d 841
(5th Cir. 1976); Wang v. Lake Maxinhall Estates, Inc., 531 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1976); Boyd v.
Lefrak Organization & Life Realty, Inc., 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975); Hairston v. R & R
Apartments, 510 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1975); Moore v. Townsend, 525 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975);
Smith v. Stechel, 510 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Long, 537 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir.
1975); Warren v. Norman Realty Co., 513 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1975); Clark v. Universal Builders, 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974); Jeanty v. McKay & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir.
1974); Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1974); Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735 (6th Cir.
1974); Morris v. Cizek, 503 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1974); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., Inc., 491 F.2d
634 (7th Cir. 1974); Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp, 499 F.2d 1197 (6th Cir., 1974); Williams
v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974); Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908 (10th Cir.
1973); Hickman v. Finchei, 483 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Jerry Pals Real Estate,
485 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1973); Love v. De Carlo Homes, Inc., 482 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1973);
Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973); Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 483 F.2d 82 (4th
Cir. 1973); Allen v. Gifford, 462 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1972); Harper v. Hutton, P-H Eq. Opp.
Hous. § 15,281 (6th Cir. 1972); Haythe v. Decker Realty Co., 468 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1972);
Male v. Crossroads Assoc., 469 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1972); Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive
Cooperative Building, 463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205
(4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Reddock, 467 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern Home
Site Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th
Cir. 1971); United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corporation, 437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971);
MeGuane v. Chennago Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1970); Edwards v Habib, 397 F.2d
687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
158. See supra note 152.
159. See D. NACHMIAS

AND

C. NACHMIAS, RESEARCH METHODS IN THE SOCIAL SCI-

20 (1976) [hereinafter cited as RESEARCH METHODS). "The variable that the researcher
wishes to explain is referred to as the dependent variable; . . . the explanatory variables are
termed independent variables. An independent variable is the hypothesized cause of a dependent variable, and the dependent variable is the expected outcome of the independent variable." Another way to view these variables is to perceive independent variables as predictor
variables and dependent variables as test variables.
160. See Marable v. H. Walker and Associates, 644 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1981) (Single status,
bad credit rating and plaintiff's "constant harrassment" rather than race caused the discrimination); Duckett v. Silberman, 568 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir.
1976) (no standing to sue); Topic v. Circle Realty, 532 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1976) (failure to
state a claim and no standing to sue at trial); Sorenson v. Raymond, 532 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.
1976) (white race is not a significant factor in eviction decision); Warren v. Norman Realty
Co., 513 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1975) (statute of limitations and failure to state a claim); Madison
v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1974) (Defendant's failure to sell to plaintiff was influenced by
income tax problems rather than race); Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1973) (A
perceived "troublesome student" rather than race produced the discriminatory behavior);
ENCES,
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sis,"' t however, is that aggrieved persons are more likely to be successful or unsuccessful based on factors which have little to do with
the merits of their case. And it is this phenomenon which contributes to the overall ineffectiveness of judicial enforcement of fair
housing laws.
B.

The Effects of Types of Plaintson Disposition

Consider the data illustrated in Table 1. There, we see the relationship between types of plaintiffs and the disposition of private disHickman v. Fincher, 485 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1973) (statute of limitation); Male v. Crossroad
Assoc., 469 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1972) (Discrimination was based on wealth rather than race);
Haythe v. Decker Realty Co., 468 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1972) (no prima facie case based on race);
Cole v. Housing Authority of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970) (Discrimination based on
residency rather than on race); McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir.
1970) (Plaintiffs eviction not cognizable under § 1983), 585 F.2d 171 (6th Cir. 1968) (statute of
limitations); Patel v. Holley House Motel, 483 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Ala. 1979) (failure to state a
claim; "motel is not a 'dwelling.' "); Logan v. Richard E. Carmack and Associates, 368 F_
Supp. 121 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (statute of limitations); Fred v. Kokinokos, 347 F. Supp. 942
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (other valid consideration rather than race caused the discrimination); Hall v.
Freitas, 343 F. Supp. 1099 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (Plaintiff lost because he had misrepresented himself); James v. Hafiler, 320 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (statute of limitations); Colon v.
289 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (Plaintiff did not first
Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc.,
proceed under New York's "substantially equivalent" law); State Division of Human Rights
on the Complaint of William Washington v. Ganley, 327 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1971) (no prima facie
case based on race); Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 265 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1970) (Plaintiff did not
commence action according to New Jersey's "substantially equivalent" law); Ford v. Wisconsin Real Estate Examining Board, 179 N.W.2d 786 (Wis. 1970) (no remedy because examining
board has no authority to revoke real estate broker's license).
161. See Braun, Statistics and the Law: Hypothesis Testing and Its Application to Title VII

Cases, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 59 (1980). It presents an excellent discussion of simple statistical
operations and their application when testing legal hypotheses and propositions. See also RESEARCH METHODS, supra note 159, at 252-253, 270-285. To understand the simple statistics
and findings presented in this article, the reader need be only familiar with the following
terms: (1)population; (2) hypothesis testing, and (3) level of significance. First, a population
is an aggregate of all cases, units, or persons which conforms to some designated set of specifications. For present purposes, the population is defined by the specification "all federal, state
and local housing discrimination cases reported in all federal and private reporters, digests and
services between 1960-1981. Secondly, hypothesis testing necessarily means stating two statistical hypotheses-an alternate and a null hypothesis. An example of the former is: A significant relationship exists between types of housing discrimination and ethnicity (H ).A null
hypothesis is: No significant relationship exists between types of housing discrimination and
ethnicity (Ho). The null hypothesis (H.) is always tested and correspondingly, the alternate
hypothesis (H ) is supported when the null hypothesis is rejected. Third, a null hypothesis is
rejected if it is not proven at a designated level ofsignificance. Some courts have accepted a
level of.05. See, Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430, 437 (1975). Note that a
.01 level is better than .05 but less better than a .001 or a .0001. A small "p"denotes level of
significance.
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TABLE 1.
DISPOSITION OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION CASES BY
TYPES OF PLAINTIFFS (N=201)
Plaintiffs
Private
Litigants

Department
of Justice

Civil & Human Rights
Organizations & Commissions

Aggrieved
Persons
Win

94
(60.3)

21
(77.8)

15
(83.3)

Defendants
Win

62
(37.9)

6
(22.2)

3
(16.7)

TOTAL

156
100.0

27
100.0

18
100.0

DISPOSITION

Chi Square = 6.105;

p = .05

df= 2;

crimination suits. The Chi Square statistic 162 suggests that the rela2
162. One way to explain the use of Chi Square (X ) is by way of a simple illustration.
Consider the data in the following table:
Ethnicity

Types of Discrimination

Jewish

Hispanic

Total

R acial Steering ..........................

1

30

31

Discrimination in Terms of Sale ...........

11

27

38

69
12
57
Total...................................
The null hypothesis is: No significant relationship exists between ethnicity and types of
housing discrimination experienced. Let X represent those experiencing racial steering and let
Y represent those experiencing discrimination in terms of sale.
31
X = total number experiencing racial steering
= -

= .45

69
total number in sample
Y = total number experiencing discrimination in terms
total number in sample

= 38
S= .55

69

The number of Hispanics and Jews expected to experience racial steering and discrimination
in terms of sale are determined by multiplying X and Y by the number of persons in each
group: The number of Jews expected to experience racial steering =
(.45) (12) = 5.4
The number of Jews expected to experience discrimination in terms of sale =
(.55) (12) = 6.6
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tionship is statistically significant well beyond the .05 level. 63 Civil
and human rights organizations have a higher probability of winning housing discrimination suits than the Department of Justice,
whose probability of winning housing discrimination suits is greater
than that of single litigants.
Some may argue that these findings are not expected, given that
an organization like the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing "has been devoting its full efforts and resources to
the cause of equal housing opportunity for more than three decades. ' ' t" In addition, it may be argued that such organizations
have more legal and financial resources than private litigants which
would increase their ability to establish a prima facie case of discrimination' 65 that is not easily rebutted. Arguments of this sort are
valid and not easily dismissed. There is, however, an important and
overriding point: If this nation is truly committed to ending discrimination in private housing, the effectiveness ofjudicial enforcement of
fair housing laws should not depend on complainant's experience,
The number of Hispanics expected to experience racial steering =
(.45) (57) = 25.6
The number of Hispanics expected to experience discrimination in terms of sale =
(.55) (57) = 31.4
To compute X2 , the expected values are tested against the respective observed values located
in the table:
2
X = the sum of (expected values - observed values)
expected values
(I - 5.4)2
(11 - 6.6)2
(30 - 25.6)2
(27 - 25.6)2
--

5.4
19.36
5.4

+

-

+

+

19.36

6.6
19.36

19.36

6.6

25.6

31.4

25.6

25.6

3.585 + 2.933 + .756 + .517 = 7.891

There are two ethnic groups and two categories of discrimination. Thus, the degrees of freedom is computed by multiplying one minus the number of groups by one minus the number of
categories, (2 - 1)x (2 - 1)= degree of freedom. The value needed to reject the null hypothesis at one degree of freedom and at the .05 level of significance is 3.841. This value is obtained
from an X2 distribution table. See Research Methods supra note 160 at 314. The present Chi
Square value, 7.891 is greater than 3.841 and is statistically at the .05 level of significance.
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected anol the alternate hypothesis is accepted by
implication.
163. See supra note 161.
164. Letter from Martin E.Sloane to Senator Charles Mathias (April 28, 1983), reprinted
inS.Rep. No.60, 98th Cong., 1stSess. 6160 (1983).
165. The data inthe following table illustrate
the relationship between types of plaintiffs
and the types of housing discrimination about which they complained:
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legal expertise, or financial resources. The influence of these factors
can be diminished substantially simply by hiring administrative law
judges to hear private housing discrimination suits.
More important, if administrative law judges arc not employed
to hear such complaints and Senate bill S. 140--or a variation of itis enacted, the likelihood of aggrieved persons winning would decrease substantially. As we have discovered, civil and human rights
organizations have the highest rate of success. However, these organizations will not have standing to sue on behalf of alleged victims of
discrimination under Senate bill S. 140. The Equal Access to HousTYPES OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION BY TYPES OF PLAINTIFFS (N=201)

Plaintiffs
Civil and Human
Rights OrganFORMS OF
DISCRIMINATION

Private
Litigants

Department
of Justice

izations and
Commissions

Refusal to
Sell
Refusal to
Rent
Discrimination
in Terms, Conditions

30
(19.2)
71
(45.5)

4
(14.8)
6
(22.2)

2
(11.1)
4
(22.2)

6

4

& Privileges

(16.7)

(22.2)

(22.2)

Managers or
Real Estate Agents
"Blockbustin" and
"Racial Steering"

20
(12.8)
9
(5.8)

3
(11.1)
8
(29.6)

3
(16.7)
5
(27.8)

Total

156

26

Misrepresentation by

100.0

Chi Square = 23.48;

dfC 8;

27

18

100.0

100.0
p = .01

There is a statistically significant relationship between these two variables. Private litigants are
more likely to complain about racial discrimination in rental units (45.5%). The Department
of Justice and organizations are more likely to initiate suits involving "block busting" and
"racial steering"; the percentages are 29.6 and 27.8 respectively. Overall, there is very little
difference between the types of suits initiated by the Attorney General and by civil and human
rights organizations.
That private litigants are more likely to lose private suits than organizations or the Department of Justice may reflect the difficulty associated with proving a certain form of discrimination. This, therefore, could explain the greater likelihood of litigants losing than, say, the
lack of financial resources or legal expertise. To test this hypothesis, we examined the relationship between the disposition of cases and types of discriminatory practices. The following
table illustrates this relationship:
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ing Act "would clarify the definition of aggrieved person in such a
way to limit66standing to individuals who are bona fide renters or
purchaser." 1
C.

The Effects of Types of Tribunals on Disposition

Another important reason to enact the Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1983-Senate bill S. 1220-is reflected in the data illustrated in Table 2. Among black victims, 67 aggrieved persons have a
greater likelihood of winning if their suits were initiated in state
courts and agencies rather than in federal district courts; the difference is an outstanding twenty-two per cent (21.7). A similar result is
found among victims who reside in urban areas. 16 Table 3 shows
that aggrieved urban persons are more likely to win a housing discrimination suit if they commence their civil action in state administrative agencies and courts rather than in federal courts.
Once more, it is important to reiterate the following point:
Types Of Housing Discrimination

Disposition
Aggrieved
Persons
Win

Refusal
to rent

19

53

21

(52.8)

Defendants
Win

TOTAL

Refusal
to sell

Discrimination
in terms, conditions, &
privileges

17
(47.2)

(65.4)
28
(34.6)

Misrepresentation

"Blockbusting" &
"Racial
steering"

22

15

(58.3)

(84.6)

(68.2)

15
(41.7)

4
(15.4)

7
(31.8)

36

81

36

26

22

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Chi Square = 7.428;

df= 4;

p <. 11 (not statistically significant)

The relationship is statistically insignificant. This means that all plaintiffs are no more likely to
win, say, blockbusting suits than suits involving discrimination in rental units. Plaintiffs won
more than 50% of all suits regardless of the form of discrimination involved.
166. Supra note 128, at 626.
167. Among non-black victims, there is no significant difference in the success rate of those
who initiated their suits in state or federal courts. Victims had exactly a fifty percent chance of
winning in each court.
168. Among rural residents, the type of tribunal did not have a significant affect on the
outcome of cases. Plaintiffs won 66.7 and 73.8, respectively, of their suits at the federal and
state levels.

HOWARD LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 27

TABLE 2.
DISPOSITION OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION SUITS BY
THE TYPES OF TRIBUNALS IN WHICH EACH SUIT
ORIGINATED (BLACK VICTIMS ONLY, N=146)
Types of Tribunals
DISPOSITION

Federal District Courts

State Courts and
Administrative Agencies

Aggrieved Persons
Win
Defendants
Win

68
(60.7)
44
(39.2)

28
(82.4)
6
(19.6)

TOTAL

112
100.0

34
100.0

Chi Square = 5.426;

df= 1;

p

=

.02

Plaintiffs should not expect to win a private discrimination suit simply because they believe someone has victimized them. A prima facie case of racial discrimination must be proved; thereafter, the
burden shifts to respondents to present strong evidence in rebuttal.
It is only after respondents fail to present such evidence that the
court should and will rule in favor of plaintiffs. But an important
question still remains: Why is the probability of success for some
persons so dependant on the type of tribunal in which they initiate
their action?
Some obvious reasons are: (1) plaintiff failed to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination in a federal district court;' 6 9
(2) the case was thrown out of federal court because plaintiff failed
to proceed first under a state's "substantially equivalent" law; 7 °
(3) victims failed to state a cognizable claim in federal court; 7 '
169. Haythe v. Decker Realty, 468 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1972).
170. Colon v. Thompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 104 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
171. Warren v. Norman Realty Co., 513 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1975).
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TABLE 3.
DISCRIMINATION SUITS BY
HOUSING
OF
DISPOSITION
THE TYPES OF TRIBUNALS IN WHICH EACH SUIT
ORIGINATED (URBAN RESIDENTS ONLY, N=150)
Types of Tribunals
DISPOSITION

Federal District Courts

State Courts and
Administrative Agencies

Aggrieved Persons
Win
Defendants
Win

67
(57.8)
49
(42.2)

26
(76.5)
8
(23.5)

TOTAL

116
100.0

34
100.0

Chi Square = 3.908;

df= 1;

p = .05

(4) persons did not have standing to sue in federal court;'7 2 and
73
(5) the statute of limitations ran against plaintiffs in federal court.
Among other things, these procedural problems represent the inability of some victims to afford effective assistance of legal counsel.
Another important, though less apparent, explanation of plaintiff's greater likelihood of success at the state level is found in the
number of cases resolved in state administrative agencies. Of the
thirty-four cases, seventy-six per cent (76.5%) were decided by administrative law judges and personnel.' 7 4 This is a very important
finding, for it lends credence to the view of those who support Senate
bill S. 1220. In their view, "the advantage of. . .administrative enforcement . . .is that the law judges are specialists in the field of

housing administration, hearing, as they do, only those types of
cases. Thus, decisions will be morepredictable and uniform as would
the setting of penalties because of the law judge's greater experience
in a specialized area.

.

.[T]he law judge's authority to issue cease

and desist orders, award relief, compensatory damages and civil pen172. Warth v. Seldin, 495 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1974).
173. Logan v. Richard E. Carmack and Associates, 368 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
174. See supra note 155.
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alties provides the 'teeth' to enforce [T]itle VIII" 1" (emphasis
added).
D. The Effects of Race and Ethnicity on Disposition
Earlier, we stated that persons indirectly affected by racial discrimination would not have standing to initiate a private suit under
the Equal Access to Housing Act; 7 6 they would also be barred from
participating in the Department of Justice's conciliation process. 77
The Fair Housing Amendment Act, S. 1220, however, would allow
those both directly and indirectly affected by racial discrimination to
receive administrative relief. 7 More important, the Supreme Court
has ruled on two separate occasions that those directly and indirectly
affected by private discrimination have standing to sue under both
the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. § 3612)179 and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1982).80 Among other things, this
means that both black and white victims may initiate a suit under
either section 1982 or sections 3610 and 3612.181 This is true, if they
are affected directly or indirectly by private racial discrimination.
The data in Table 4, however, illustrates a very interesting and
serious problem associated with judicial enforcement of fair housing
laws. Thirty-four states'82 have some type of fair housing laws. And
if we only consider litigants (N= 109) who reside in these states, we
find the following: Black victims have a substantially higher
probability of winning a private discrimination suit than white vic175. Supra note 113, at 6153-6154. (statement of Sen. Mathias).
176. See supra note 166.
177. Id See also supra note 132.
178. Supra note 113, at 6154.
179. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). In Trafficante,
the Court construed section 3612 to define standing as broadly as is constitutionally permissible. This section provides that the "rights granted by [§§ 3603-3606] of the Act may be enforced by civil action in appropriate United States district courts .... " Thus, § 3612 as well
as § 3610 of the Act grants standing to sue to those affected directly and indirectly by private
racial discrimination.
180. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). In Sullivan, the Court
ruled that a white who leased his home to a black had standing to sue under § 1982, although
the black lessee was the direct victim of racial discrimination.
181. Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Rosales Co., 429 F. Supp. 486,
490 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
182. See supra notes 53-55.
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tims. 183 The percentages are 73.1% and 37.5%, respectively. The
most compelling question is: Why are white victims so unsuccessful,
given they, too, are protected by section 1982 and by section 36103612?
TABLE 4.
DISPOSITION OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION CASES BY
RACE OF VICTIMS (SUITS ORIGINATING IN STATES
THAT HAVE SOME FAIR HOUSING LAWS, N=109)
Victims' Race
DISPOSITION
Aggrieved
Persons
Win
Defendants
Win

Black*

White

68

2

(73.1)
25
(26.9)

(37.5)
10
(62.5)

This category includes four suits initiated by Hispanics

16
100.0

93
100.0

Total
Chi Square

=

7.964;

df= 1;

p = .01

One may argue that black victims are better situated to establish
a stronger prima facie case of private racial discrimination than
white victims although there is very little evidence in the present
data to support this point of view.'8 4 Earlier we discovered that
some alleged victims of discrimination have a higher likelihood of
winning a private suit if their cases were: 1) litigated by civil and
human rights organizations and 2) initiated in state administrative
183. This relationship was not statistically significant among litigants who resided in states
that did not have any type of fair housing laws.
184. In addition, there is no statistically significant difference between the legal theories
used to decide cases involving black and white victims, respectively:
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agencies and courts."i 5 Is it possible that black victims are more
successful than whites because a higher percentage of their cases are
initiated in state proceedings and litigated by civil rights organizations? Our examination of the data reveals no significant differences
between the two groups. Blacks are no more likely to initiate their
action in state proceedings than whites.' 86 In addition, civil rights
18 7
organizations are no more likely to represent Blacks than whites.
Additional hypotheses may be formulated and tested in order to
explain why tribunals are responding more favorably to Blacks than
to whites, although both groups are victims of private racial discrimination. The central point, however, is that imbalance should not be
occurring in such proceedings. Regardless of the "correct" explanaRace of Victims
Black

Legal Theories

White

18

42 U.S.C.A. § 1982

3

(19.4)
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3610 &

(18.8)
3

II

3612

Combination of

(11.8)
32
(34.4)
32

(18.8)
5
(313)
5

Theories

(34.4)

(31.3)

TOTAL

93
100.0

16
100.0

State Statutes

Chi Square = .5921;

df- 3;

p

-

.89 (statistically insignificant)

185. See Tables 1, 2 and 3.
186. The following table illustrates that the relationship between the race of victims and

types of tribunals is statistically insignificant:
Race of Victims
Types of
Tribunals

Black

White

Federal District
Courts

60
(64.5)

12
(75.0)

State Administrative

33

4

Agencies and Courts

(35.5)

(25.0)

TOTAL

93
100.0

16
100.0

df= I;
p = .41 (statistically insignificant)
Chi Square = .6691;
187. The following table illustrates the relationship between the race of victims and types
of plaintiffs; the relationship is statistically insignificant.
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tion, Senate bill S. 1220 can remove, or is more likely to significantly
reduce, the effects of this phenomenon.' 8 8 In contrast, Senate bill S.
140 is more likely to perpetuate it, for S. 140 places considerably
more emphasis on judicial enforcement of fair housing laws.
E. The Effects of "Testers" on Disposition
It has been estimated by HUD that "more than 2 million instances of housing discrimination occur each year.'' 88 More important, "discrimination may be and often is artfully cloaked and
concealeld in sophisticated language so that its true nature does not
become obvious."19 Thus, "testers"lg' have been recognized by the
courts to be an important part of the fight against racial discrimination.' 92 In addition, testers are useful because they contribute to the
"accomplishment of the principal objective of Congress in passing
Race of Victims
s

T ap of
intiffs

Black

White

Private
Litigants

85
(91.4)

15
(93.8)

8
(8.6)

9
(6.2)

93
100.0

16
100.0

Civil & Human
Rights Organizations
TOTAL

Chi Square = .2811;
df- 1;
p - .86 (statistically insignificant)
188. During the introduction of Senate bill S. 1220, Senator Metzenbaum stated:
The bill . . . provide[s] the effective remedies we need. It establishes a streamlined
administrative procedure within the Department of Housing and Urban Development to process individuals' complaints of housing discrimination. Administrative law
judges experienced in fair housing issues would be available to aggrieved persons.
Cases would be heard by specialists in the field rather than byiudges dealing with a
multitude of dfferent topics. (emphasis added).
Supra note 113, at 6162-63.
189. Id, at 6152.
190. See supra note 169.
191. Persons who posed as potential homebuyers or apartment dwellers are called "testers." Testing is a technique used to determine whether discriminatory practices are being used
by comparing the experiences of blacks and whites in seeking to rent or buy the same apartments or houses." See Note, Is the U.S. Committed to FairHousing? Enforcement of the Fair
Housing Act Remains a CrucialProblem, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 641,655 n. 95 (1980). See also
Wheatley Heights, 429 F. Supp. 486 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (Testers have standing to sue under
§ 3612 of the 1968 Civil Rights Act).
192. See United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Youritan Construction Co., 370 F. Supp. 645, 647 n.3, 650 (N.D. Cal. 1973), modoed
on other grounds, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1974).
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the Fair Housing Act."' 9 3
At the outset, we mentioned that supporters of both the Fair
Housing Amendment Act-S. 1220 and the Equal Access to Housing Act-stress the importance of ending private discrimination in
housing. However, the Equal Access Act would "limit the use of
testers" to instances in which testing is only "necessary to confirm an
alleged violation" of the law.' 94 (emphasis added). In contrast, the
Fair Housing Amendment Act would allow testing unconditionally.
"'Aggrieved' persons . . .would include testers and auditors who,
as the Supreme Court has. . . held, have the same [T]itle VIII right
as others . . . to receive truthful information about the availability
of housing."195

If proponents of the Equal Access to Housing Act are truly serious about ending or significantly reducing the incidence of racial discrimination, they should give careful consideration to the data
illustrated in Table 5. Of two-hundred and one suits, forty-two20.8 per cent-were initiated by testers. However, testers won an
TABLE 5.
DISPOSITION OF PRIVATE HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
SUITS BY TYPES OF "AGGRIEVED" PERSONS (N=201)
Aggrieved Persons
DISPOSITION

Testers

Aggrieved Person
Win
Defendants
Win
Total
Chi Square = 7.089;

Non-Testers

35
(83.3)
7
(16.7)

95
(59.7)
64
(40.3)

42
100.0

159
100.0
df= 1;

p

=

.01

193. See United States v. Wisconsin, 395 F. Supp. 732, 734 (W.D.Wis. 1975).
194. See supra note 129, at 626.
195. See supra note 113, at 6154.
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outstanding eighty-three per cent (83.3) of the forty-two suits initiated by them. Non-testers, presumably, the single private litigants,
won sixty per cent (59.7) of their suits.
Although the purpose of this article is to stress the importance
of reducing the incidence of private litigation, there will be instances
in which alleged victims of discrimination will ask the courts to enforce fair housing laws. This might occur following unproductive
administrative hearings. Given that testers have a history of providing relevant and credible evidence,' 9 6 it would be counterproductive
to limit their role in the fight to end racial discrimination in private
housing. Under any proposal to strengthen the enforcement procedures of Title VIII, testers should receive an unqualified right to sue
on their own behalf and on behalf of other victims of discrimination.
It is very clear that the likelihood of winning a discrimination suit is
influenced considerably by whether plaintiffs are testers or not.
Stated differently, the risk of losing a private suit is greater if aggrieved persons are not testers.
F. The Influence of 'Substantially Equivalent" FairHousing Laws
on Disposition
Another important feature of the proposed Fair Housing
Amendment Act (S. 1220) is the required referral of cases filed with
HUD to state and local agencies which protect rights and provide
19 7
remedies substantially equivalent to those provided in the Act.
The proposed Equal Access to Housing Act would also require referrals. It would require the Department of Justice "to refer all charges
of Title VIII violations to certified state housing discrimination
agencies where they are in existence."' 9 8 And, unlike the proposed
Fair Housing Act, the Equal Access Act would permit such referrals
if certified agencies provide rights and remedies which are only "reasonably equivalent" to the rights and remedies provided by Title
VIII. 199

Although Senate bill S.140 fails to give a precise definition of
"reasonable equivalency," one may infer that this term is not synon196. See supra note 192. See also Wheatley Heights, 429 F. Supp. at 487-88 (1977).
197. Supra note 113, at 6154.
198. Supra note 129, at 626.

199. Id.
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ymous with "substantial equivalency. ' '200 Among other things, a
substantially equivalent law means that a "state or local law may not
place any excessive burdens on the complainant which might discourage the filing of complaints." 20 1 The Equal Access to Housing
Act, itself, would place considerably greater burden on plaintiffs by
requiring them to prove intentional racial discrimination. °2 And as
we have discovered, the most recent evidence shows conclusively
that this requirement is a difficult burden to overcome.20 3 One may
infer, therefore, that "reasonably equivalent" laws would decrease
the likelihood of aggrieved persons receiving redress at the state and
local levels.
The view profferred here is that any proposal to strengthen the
current enforcement provisions of Title VIII should not adopt a
"reasonable equivalency" standard to certify state and local agencies; the "substantial equivalency" standard should remain for a very
important reason. Consider the data illustrated in Table 6, in which
the relationship between the disposition of private suits and the presence of "substantially equivalent" laws in states" ° where the cause
of action arose is presented. Among alleged black victims, the presence or absence of "substantially equivalent" laws significantly influences whether victims are successful in court. 20 5 Aggrieved persons
are more likely to win a private discrimination in housing suit if
"substantially equivalent" laws are present within their state. Only
fifty-five suits originated in states whose fair housing laws are "substantially equivalent" to federal law; however, black victims won an
impressive seventy-eight per cent (78.2) of these suits in judicial proceedings and hearings.
Although the presence of "substantially equivalent" laws affects
outcome, the present investigation also reveals that the presence of
any fair housing laws at the state or local level will increase plaintifs chances of winning. This is true, regardless of the victims' race,
the types of plaintiffs who initiated the cause of action, or the types
of tribunal in which the suit was initiated.
200. See supra note 53 for a definition of "substantial equivalency."
201. Id
202. Id.
203. See supra note 148.
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TABLE 6.
DISPOSITION OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION SUITS BY
THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF "SUBSTANTIALLY
EQUIVALENT" FAIR HOUSING LAWS. (Black victims only,
N=146)
"Substantially Equivalent" Laws
DISPOSITION
Aggrieved
Persons
Win
Defendants
Win
Total
Chi Square - 6.052;

Present

Absent

43
(78.2)
12
(21.8)

53
(58.2)
38
(41.8)

55
100.0

91
100.0

df= 1;

p = .02

Table 7 presents the statistical relationship between the disposition of suits and the origination of the cause of action in states20 6 that
possess fair housing laws of any kind. The results show that victims
of discrimination are more likely to receive a favorable judgment if
their states have some type of fair housing law. However, a comparison of Tables 6 and 7 shows that victims have a greater likelihood of
winning if "substantially equivalent" laws rather than just any fair
housing laws are present within their states.
Obviously, one may interpret these findings from several perspectives. But these compelling facts remain: In "substantially
equivalent" states, aggrieved persons are required initially to carry
their complaints to an administrative board or to a human relations
commission. Hearings before these bodies are more likely to be in204. See supra note 54.
205. Among white victims, the presence or absence of "substantially equivalent" laws did
not significantly affect the disposition of housing discrimination suits. The probability of winning with or without the presence of these laws was 58.3 and 41.7 percent, respectively.
206. See supra notes 54-55.
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TABLE 7.
DISPOSITION OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION SUITS BY..
WHETHER THE STATE HAS ANY FAIR HOUSING LAWS
(N=201)
State Fair Housing Laws
DISPOSITION
Aggrieved
Persons
Win
Defendant
Win
Total
Chi Square - 3.942;

Present

Absent

88
(69.8)
38
(30.2)

42
(56.0)
33
(44.0)

126
100.0

75
100.0

df= 1;

p = .05

formal; thus, procedural problems such as the failure to exhaust state
remedies, the failure to state a cognizable claim, and the failure to
make a timely demand for a jury trial are absent. The removal of
these issues, therefore, allows administrative boards and commissions to decide the merits of each case. If the claims are meritorious,
the plaintiffs' win. If there is an unfavorable ruling, the complainants can commence legal action in an appropriate state or federal
court. However, by the time the cases reach the appropriate court,
many of the "fatal" procedural pitfalls' 7 would have been removed.
This, therefore, would increase the likelihood of a tribunal deciding
each case on its merit and the likelihood of the aggrieved persons
winning. It is very clear that the presence or absence of "substantially equivalent" laws affects the disposition of private suits. Thus,
any attempt to add "teeth" to the enforcement provision of Title
VIII should not remove the "substantial equivalency" standard.
G. Disposition of Private Suits and the Wisdom of Requiring
Aggrieved Persons to Prove IntentionalDiscrimination
Earlier, we compared and contrasted the most important fea207. See supra note 160.
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tures of both the proposed Fair Housing Amendment Act and the
Equal Access to Housing Act. We observed that the latter act would
require aggrieved persons to prove that a landlord or realtor intended to discriminate on the basis of race; the former act would
simply require alleged victims to prove a "disparate impact" or the
"effects" of racial discrimination.
Supporters of the Equal Access Act advocate the adoption of
the intent standard, for in their view the "use of the effects test by
HUD and (by) the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department
has been the basis by which they have sought to impose their own notions ofproper racialbalance upon communities which have had no

intent or purpose of discriminating against protected groups 20 (emphasis added). These supporters also stress that the adoption of the
intent standard would give a respondent his or her fair day in court.
That is, a respondent "will be assured that, before he is labeled a
civil rights violator, there will have been some evidence of a discriminatory intent,. . . not simply evidence that his apartmentbuilding or
his subdivision lacked the rightproportionof white, black, yellow, red,

and brown races"

' 9

(emphasis added).

2
A careful review of private discrimination in housing suits ,I
and of racially-motivated exclusionary zoning suits2 1 I does not sup-

port these views or justifications for requiring victims to prove intentional racial discrimination in private dwellings.
First, every
exclusionary zoning suit necessarily involves state action. Thus, an
aggrieved person is required to prove racially-motivated discriminatory state action pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. And, although a person may choose to advance his cause of action against exclusionary zoning by relying
upon the "effects test," the evidence simply does not show that this
method has been the basis upon which HUD and the Department of
Justice have sought to impose racial balance upon local
communi22
ties. The intent standard has been used in these cases. 1
Secondly, an examination of the present two-hundred and one
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See supra note 129, at 626.
Id
Supra notes 155-157.
Supra note 148.
Id
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private suits reveals that the concern about forcing owners of apartment complexes or subdivisions to maintain "the right proportion"
of dwellers on the basis of race is unwarranted. When the issue of
"proportion" has been before the courts, it has appeared in connection with other issues, namely "blockbusting' 23 and "racial steering.",21 4 More often, it is real estate brokers who are more likely to be
concerned about the proportions of racial minorities entering or
leaving a particular neighborhood. Among other purposes, these
proportions are used to frighten gullible white homeowners into selling their homes at ridiculously low prices.25
Finally, it must be reiterated that there is little evidence to suggest that HUD and the Department of Justice have used the effects
test "as an instrument of social engineering ....,216 Certainly, the
effects test has been the basis upon which many housing discrimination disputes have been resolved. This is so because, under section
1982 and sections 3601-3619 and some state fair housing laws, a
prima facie case of racial discrimination is established when an aggrieved party proves that a "disparate impact" has occurred-which
is the essence of the "effects" test. The crucial point, however, is that
there is little credible evidence to support the supposition that respondents are unduly harmed by the use of the "effects" test.
Table 8 illustrates the distribution and frequency of laws cited
213. See Note, Blockbusting, 59 GEo. L.J. 170 (1970) and Note, Blockbusting. A Novel
Statutory Approach to an Increasingy Serious Problem, 7 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROB. 538
(1971) for a discussion of "blockbusting." See also, Confessions of a Blockbuster, Saturday
Evening Post, July 14, 1962. "Blockbusting" or attempted "blockbusting" can appear in several forms. Courts have found prima facie cases of blockbusting on the basis of the following:
Realtor to homeowner: "Blacks are moving in .... You should sell while you can still get a
good price . . . [T]he neighborhood is getting black and would be unsafe to live in ....
354 F. Supp. 291, 293 (D. Md. 1973); Plaintiff reports: "(An agent) of State Realty telephoned
.... Inthe call she stated that the neighborhood 'was going colored and she might as well
face it," Sanborn v. Wagner, 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
214. There is no universal definition of "racial steering." See Fair Housing Amendments
Act of 1979: Hearings in H.R. 2540 Before the Subcomm. in the Const. of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., IstSess. 174 (1979) (statement of Robert C. Weaver). "Racial
steering" is a practice of real estate brokers who direct buyers, on the basis of race, toward a
particular house or neighborhood because of its racial composition; Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F.
Supp. 1928, 1047 (E.D. Mich. 1975). "Unlawful steering" is "the use of a word of phrase or
action by a real estate broker or salesperson which is intended to influence the choice of a
prospective property buyer on a racial basis." See also, United States v. Hernandez, 580 F.2d
189 (5th Cir. 1978). The Court held that "steering blacks to a particular group of apartments
in a complex effectively denies access to equal housing."
215. See generally Confessions of a Blockbuster, Saturday Evening Post. July 14, 1962.
216. Supra note 129, at 625.
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to decide the suits discussed in this presentation. The data indicate
that the 201 cases were resolved by reference to laws that require
only that complainants prove the effects of racial discrimination.
This is an important finding because, of the two-hundred and one
litigated cases, aggrieved persons won sixty five per cent and respondents won thirty five per cent at the trial level. More important, respondents' likelihood of success increased on appellate review.
TABLE 8.
TYPES OF LAWS CITED TO RESOLVE PRIVATE
DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING SUITS (N=201)
LAWS
Civil Rights Act
of 1866,
(§ 1982)
Civil Rights Act
of 1968,
(§ 3601 et seq.)
Both §§ 1982 &
3601 et seq.
State & Local Fair
Housing Laws
Total

Frequency

Per Cent

35

17.4

61

30.3

61

30.3

44

22.0

201

100.0

In light of these findings, it is very difficult to understand why
Congress would want to require victims of discrimination to prove
that a realtor's, a homeowner's, or a subdivision developer's behavior was motivated by racial animosity. As we have seen, there are
enough extra legal pitfalls associated with private litigation.
CONCLUSION

There is general consensus that racial discrimination in private
housing is still rampant in the United States2" 7 and that it will persist, unless Congress passes legislation to strengthen the enforcement
217. Supra notes 1-4.
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provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. As of this writing, two
competing bills have been introduced in the Senate which a llegedly
put "teeth" into the enforcement provisions of Title VIII. Reference
is made to the Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1983 and the Equal
Access to Housing Act of 1983, Senate bills S. 1220 and S. 140,
respectively.
The Fair Housing Amendment Act would attempt to enforce
fair housing laws and reduce the incidence of discrimination largely
by means of administrative hearings. Independent administrative
law judges would provide a speedy, fair, and inexpensive hearing for
the person alleging housing discrimination as well as for the person
charged. Although alleged victims may "file a private lawsuit up
until the time an administrative hearing commences, "218 the virtue
of Senate bill S. 1220 is its emphasis on expediting private housing
disputes administratively rather than judicially. In fact, Senate bill
S. 1220 is designed to discourage the use of federal and state courts
as forums for settling housing discrimination disputes.
The proposed Equal Access to Housing Act, however, "would
encourage the use of Federal magistrates in actions brought under its
provisions in an effort to expedite [private discrimination in housing]
'
cases." 219
And although proponents of the Equal Access Act suggest
that "such adversarial litigation will be a last, not a first step in the
process of resolving complaints, ' 220 evidence suggests otherwise.
Senate bill S. 140 would move the "internal" conciliation process
from HUD to the Department of Justice, because the bill's proponents assert that "the Justice Department . . . possesses far more ex22 1
pertise in the enforcement of civil rights laws than does HUD."
But we know that the conciliation process has not worked effectively
at HUD, 22 2 and there is little evidence that it will be more effective,
once established in the Department of Justice. Thus, if the Equal
Access to Housing Act or any variation of it2 23 is enacted, adver218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Supra note 113, at 6153.
Supra note 129.
Id
Id
Supra note 113, at 6152. Senator Mathias stated: "Even though the number of dis-

crimination complaints filed with HUD has increased from 2,931 to 5,112 in 1982, the Department's success in conciliating those complaints still remains below 20 per cent."
223. The Reagan Administration has also proposed a bill to strenthen the enforcement
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Reference is made to Senate bill S. 1612, 98th
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sarial litigation will be as prevalent as it is today.
This article has attempted to convey a central point: If we are
truly concerned about reducing discrimination in private housing
and redressing the problems of victims of discrimination we should
not use the courts. Private litigation is expensive and "the already
critical overburdening of the courts argues against flooding them
with controversies of this type which generally have small precedential significance.

' 224

More important, there is no guarantee that gen-

uine victims of discrimination will win in court. Procedural
problems such as failure to state a cognizable claim, failure to exhaust state remedies, or failure to file a timely claim will prevent
some victims from being successful. The employment of competent
legal counsel may ameliorate these problems. But there are other
problems over which a competent lawyer or a victim has no control.
We discovered that the likelihood of winning or losing was affected significantly by: (1) whether aggrieved persons were Blacks,
Hispanics, or whites; (2) whether plaintiffs were individual private
litigants, the Attorney General, or civil rights organizations;
(3) whether "substantially equivalent" laws were present or absent
within a state; (4) whether aggrieved persons were testers or nontesters; (5) whether the suits were decided in federal district courts, in
state courts, or in state administrative hearings; and (6) whether
states had any fair housing laws.
Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. 9880 (1983). Unfortunately, the Administration's bill is also
entitled the "Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1983." However, it is very unlike Senate bill S.
1220, the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1983. Instead, the Administration's proposal is
more akin to the Equal Access to Housing Act of 1983, Senate bill S.140, for S. 1612 encourages the use of federal and state courts to settle private discrimination in housing disputes.
Specifically, S. 1612 would authorize the Justice Department to commence a civil suit in federal court on behalf of aggrieved persons after HUD's investigation-conciliation process has
failed. Unlike S. 140, Senate bill S. 1612 would not transfer the conciliation process from
HUD to the Department of Justice. Under this bill, the Attorney General would still have the
authority to commence a civil action in a federal district court whenever there is reasonable
cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of
resistance to the full enjoyment of their rights under Title VIII. In addition, a private litigant
may initiate a housing discrimination suit even though a complaint has been filed with HUD,
and without regard to the status of the complaint. Finally, S. 1612 is unlike the Equal Access
to Housing Act in two other major respects: (1) it would retain the "substantially equivalent"
standard for certifying state and local agencies; and (2) it would allow the courts to assess a
civil penalty against the respondent in an amount not exceeding $50,000. The Equal Access
Act would allow courts to award a civil penalty up to $1,00. Senate bill S. 1220 would permit
courts to award civil penalties up to $10,000. id. at 9884.
224. Id at 6153.
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Therefore, given the ineffectiveness of HUD's enforcement of
fair housing laws and the inherent problems associated with private
litigation, the Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1983--S. 1220should be enacted. "Experience with. . comparable state and local agencies repeatedly has shown that the administrative process is
quicker and fairer

. .

.[Individual court suits . . .place a greater

burden of expense, time and effort on not only the plaintiff but on all
other parties involved, including the seller, broker and mortgage
financier, and on the judicial system itself."22

225.

112 CONG. REC. 18402 (1966). (statement of Rep. Conyers).

